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ABSTRACT
Antecedents of Pre-Negotiation: An Analysis of 
Egyptian-Israeli (1970-1978) and Syrian-Israeli (1992-1995) 
Conflict
by
Zeynep Selçuk
Pre-negotiation is a first step towards conflict termination. There are certain 
factors which either facilitate or hinder the pre-negotiation phase towards conflict 
terminaton. For this purpose two cases, Pre-Camp David Phase of Egyptian-Israeli 
and Post Cold War period of the Syrian-Israeli conflicts are analyzed. Variables 
borrowed from the negotiation literature are used as analytical tools to investigate the 
cases.
The variables are provided with an operational definition and a propositon, on 
which the cases are investigated. First, the presence of these variables are tested on 
the cases and then if they are present their effects are coded, based on the inferences 
from the two conflicts, as whether being a facilitator or a hinderance towards conflict 
termination. Finally in the conclusion part whether these results are in accordance 
with the initial propositions are discussed.
The Syrian-Israeli case had a frequency of more facilitating factors. The major 
difference in the two cases is that despite its low frequency in facilitating factors, the 
Egyptian Israeli conflict ended in a formal agreement whereas the Syrian-Israeli 
conflict did not. This contradictory outcome is dwelled upon in the conclusion. The 
major inferences that can be accumulated firom the research are discussed in the 
conclusion.
I l l
' Key Words: Pre-negotiation, conflict termination, conflict resolution. Models of 
Timing, Hurting Stalemate Model, Imminent Mutual Catastrophe Model, Enticiug 
Opprtunity Model, Entrapment Model.
IV
öz
Mısır-Israil (1970-1978) ve Suriye-Israil (1992-1995) Anlaşmazlıklarında
Müzakere Öncesi Analizi 
Zeynep Selçuk
Müzakere öncesi süreç, resmi müzakerelere doğru atılan ük adimdir. Bu süreci 
anlaşmaya doğra götüren veya anlaşmayı engelleyen bazı faktörler bulunmaktadır. 
Camp David Öncesi Mısır-Israil ve Soğuk Savaş Sonrası Suriye-Israil anlaşmazlığı 
bu analizin tabanım oluşturmaktadır. Faktörlerin analizi bu İki anlaşmazlıktan 
yaralamlarak yapılmıştır.
Faktörler önce araştırma içinde kullamlan tanımlarıyla belirtilmiş olup, birer 
varsayım önerisiyle birlikte verilmiştir. Eğer anlaşmazlık içinde faktörlere 
rastlandıysa, etkileri verilmiştir. Sonuç bölümünde, etkilerin varsayımlara uygunluğu 
tartışıkmştır.
Yapılan araştırmada Suriye-Israil anlaşmazlığı, anlaşmaya götüren faktörler 
açısından daha zengindir. İki anlaşmazlık arasındaki en büyük fark, ilk anlaşmazlığm 
(anlaşma sağlayan faktörler açısmdan yüksek oranda desteklenmemesine rağmen) 
resmi bir anlaşmayla noktalanmış olmasıdır. Bu konuda ikilem gibi gözüken bulgu, 
sonuç bölümünde açıklanmıştır.
Genel çıkaranlar, sonuç bölümünde özet olarak verilmiştir.
Anahtar Kelimeler ; Müzakere öncesi, anlaşmazlık sonu, anlaşmazlık çözümü. 
Zamanlama Modelleri.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The aim of this study is to investigate the factors which impregnate or halt the 
process of conflict termination. For this purpose, pre-negotiation phase of two cases , 
Pre-Camp David phase of the Egyptian-Israeli conflict and the Syrian- Israeli conflict 
in the Post Cold War period are examined. Variables borrowed from the negotiation 
literature constitute the analytical tools of this study.
1.1 LITERATURE REVIEW
Pre-negotiation is a new research topic to many social scientists who concentrate 
on negotiation. A current debate in the negotiation field is, whether pre-negotiation is 
a prelude to negotiation or part of it^ Number of researchers have identified pre­
negotiation as an important element of the overall process of conflict termination but 
few have elaborated on this concepf.
1.1.1 MODELS OF TIMING
1.1.1.1 THE HURTING STALEMATE MODEL
Mitchell  ^puts forward the view that conflicts are susceptible to termination only 
at the appropriate moment - or more appropriately when the appropriate set of 
circumstances - arrives"^ . For this purpose he introduces four models which 
categorize the different set of circumstances that may be neccessary in arriving at 
conflict termination, either from a point of deadlock or an on going act of coercion.
These models axe: the hurting stalemate, the entrapment, the imminent mutual 
catastrophe and the enticing opportunity model.
This model was initially suggested by Zartman^ and later developed by Stedman^ 
and Haass^. It originated from Zartman’s model which emphasizes the importance 
of the “ripe moment, that denotes to the proper time or fertile environment, to move 
towards conflict termination^. The argument that Zartman puts forward is that the 
adversaries will most likely consider a negotiated settlement, at the prognostication of 
a long period of costly action and low probability of achieving goals, at the threshold 
of a looming disaster.
The main argument of the hurting stalemate model is that parties will seek a 
negotiation only when they are convinced that continuing current strategies will not 
result in the most desired outcome. What will stimulate the parties to move towards 
conflict termination is (or at least to the greatest degree) extended pain. Mitchell^ 
points out that, leaders will only reconsider them policies of coercion, only at the pain 
of loss (expended resovmces) and damage. This model may imply that leaders learn 
through being in a stalemate that hurts but this may not be the only cmcumstance that 
motivates the leader into taking cooperative measures. Mitchell also makes a 
reference to increase in costs and absence of benefits of victory in The Structure o f 
International Conflict’ .^ He depicts that, at tunes continued opportunity costs may be 
effective and at others, absence of benefits of victory may push the leader towards 
conflict termination.
1.1.1.2 THE ENTRAPMENT MODEL
11 12This model is pioneered by Edmead and Teger . The entrapment model 
stresses the fact that the key decision maker sees herself trapped within the framework 
of the conflict. The leader has too much invested to quit Even if there is no promise 
of attaining the policy goals, past sufferings trigger the leader to continue coercion 
since no other alternative is presented. The leader feels trapped and there appears to 
be no way of breaking the vicious circle of coercion.
Despite the hurting stalemate model, the entrapment model suggests that hurts and
13costs can become reasons for continuing rather than abandoning a coercive strategy .
1.1.3.2 THE IMMINENT CATASTROPHE MODEL
Zartman "^*is the proponent of this model. Differing from his hurting stalemate 
scheme, he does not view a stalemate as the only ingredient for conflict termination. 
In the imminent disaster model, an overwhelming disaster threatens the adversaries 
whether or not there is a stalemate. At this jimcture the results are more drastic, if the 
leader was unwilling to change her current policies, a disaster that will effect both of 
the adversaries will stimulate change. The losses have to be great and has to be 
experienced mutually. If one side suffers more than the other, cooperation will either 
be delayed or not reached at all.
1.1.1.4 THE ENTICING OPPORTUNITY MODEL
The proponents of this model are Mitchell*^ and Crocker^ .^ In this model the 
emphasis is on leaders and their options. Leaders concentrate on benefits of
cooperating rather than losses of coercion. They see a better way of achieving goals 
rather than slogging with struggle^^.
From the above review three important categories that have an impact on conflict 
termination, evolve. These are the role of international context, domestic 
circumstance and the leader.
1.1.2 LEVELS OF CONFLICT TERMINATION
1.1.2.1 THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT
This category is highly emphasized by Hopmann^*. In analysing conditions for 
the resolution of international conflicts, he focuses on the patterns of cooperative and 
disruptive behaviors of the adversaries as well as the network of governmental and 
non-governmental organizations within which these adversaries function^ Rikhye^° 
stresses the importance of efforts of the UN and the Secretary General’s attempts at 
peace which emphasizes the importance of intermediaries that guide the, adversaries 
toward negotiation. Diedrhig analyzes superpower strategies ia conflict termination 
especially in the Beirut Case between the years 1982-84. In his article We Need A 
Larger Theory o f Pre-Negotiation , Saunders intermingles the importance of 
ititemational context with domestic consensus and the “soundness” of the decision 
maker towards the decision to terminate conflict.
1.1.2.1 THE DOMESTIC CIRCUMSTANCE
23Jo L. Husbands in Domestic Factors and De-Escalation Initiatives pays 
particular attention to domestic factors such as public opinion and non-govemmental 
organizations in preparing the groxmd for conflict termination. Louis Kriesberg in his
book International Conflict Resolution“^ examines the Arab- Israeli conflict and pays 
particular attention to intra-party disputes. According to this study lack of party 
consensus delays the peace attempts.
1.1.2.3 THE LEADER
2.5 26The proponents of enticing opportunity model, Mitchell and Crocker view the 
leader in an optimistic fashion; the leader can gain more by quiting while ahead. She 
can change priorities or see there is more to gain by cooperating and therefore would 
contribute to moving towards negotiations. Rubin pays particular attention to 
leadership styles of different decision makers in Leadership and Negotiation in the 
Middle East. He analyzes different leaders in the region and their styles in handling 
negotiating attempts. King depicts that a change in leader may promote a change in 
leadership style and therefore this alone might contribute to moving towards 
negotiation.
1.2 THE OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY
As noted before, the aim of this study is to investigate the factors which 
impregnate or halt the process of conflict termination. For this purpose, pre­
negotiation phase of two cases, Pre-Camp David phase of the Egyptian- Israeli 
conflict and the Syrian- Israeli conflict in the Post Cold War period are examined.
Based on the above literature review, the following variables are identified and 
used as tools to analyze the two cases: a)the role of allies; b)the role of the 
intermediary; c)systemic change; d)the effect of intra-party disputes; e)the role of 
public opinion; f)role of Non-Govemmental Organizations ( NGO), g)threat of a
looming disaster, h)change in leader/ leadersidp style, i)costs outweighing benefits, 
and j)change in priority. These variables are grouped under three main categories; the 
international Context, the domestic circumstance and the leader.
TABLE 1: SUMMARY OF ANALYTICAL TOOLS
MTEBNATIONAL
CONTEXT
DOMESTIC
CIRCUMSTANCE
THE LEADER
Role of Allies Effect of Intra-Party 
Dispute
Fear of Looming Disaster
Role of Intermediary Role of Public Opioion Leader Change / Leadership 
Style
Systemic Change Role of NGO Costs Outweighing Benefits
Change In Priority
Again, these variables are used as research tools to analyze the two cases. At the 
first stage of the analysis the presence or absence of the variables are individually 
identified for each conflicting party in each case i.e Egypt and Israel, Syria and Israel. 
At the second stage, if they are present, their impact on the pre-negotiating phase is 
investigated.
1.3 THE ANALYTICAL TOOLS
1.3.1 THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT
The international context in this research denotes to the entities that are external to 
the state. The variables that will be investigated within the framework of this category 
are: role of allies , role of the intermediary and systemic change.
1.3.1.1 THE ROLE OF ALLffiS
In this research allies are defined as states that provide economic, military and 
political support to the conflicting parties. The ally does not have to be a superpower, 
can be a neighbor, member of the same organization or take part in the same 
ideological or religious pact . It is usually assumed that allies provide the extra 
confidence that a state desires in the event of an ambivilance of whether quitting 
coercion or continuing. If the ally has some (economic, political or social) influence 
over the party and if peace is not within the interest of the ally, then the party will not 
be channeled into cooperation.
1.3.1.2 THE ROLE OF INTERMEDIARY
An intermediary is a go between the conflicting parties. It can be an organization, 
a state, or an individual. It can take the role of a facilitator where the intermediary 
works on the communication between the parties. It can also provide resources or 
has the leverage to mould the parties toward conflict termination. The intermediary 
brings in extra sources so that cooperation is more desirable and it facilitates 
communication.
It is usually assumed that the intermediary that brings in desirable extra sources, 
such as new information, financial assistance and political support will contribute to 
facilitation of the pre-negotiation process towards negotiation.
13.1.3 THE SYSTEMIC CHANGE
The systemic change pertains to the end of the Cold War. The absence of the 
Soviet Union created reconfigurations and ramifications in the tightly knit bi-polar 
alliance structures. The bi-polar system changed to a multi-polar system. It is usually 
assumed that a systemic change, namely end of a bi-polar international system will 
contribute to peace and cooperation since the parties of the regional conflicts are not 
backed by superpowers.
1.3.2 THE DOMESTIC CIRCUMSTANCE
Domestic Circumstance denotes to all the political, social and economic changes 
that take place within a state. These changes can be in an entity or a group like a non­
governmental organization (NGO) or public opinion. It can also be an event like an 
on going intra-party dispute. The variables within the framework of domestic 
circumstance are : effect of intra-party dispute, role of public opinion, and role of 
NGO’s .
1.3.2.1 THE EFFECT OF INTRA-PARTY DISPUTE
Intra-party cohesion is vital in implementing any domestic or international policy. 
Intra-party dispute can be defined as the party of the leader having a difficult time 
adjusting to the policies concerning the initiative for peace. The leader must have 
strong support from her party so that her policies or initiatives receive acceptance
both domestically and internationally. In the cases that will be examined, the leader 
either overcomes her intra-party disputes or does not take them into consideration.
1.3.2.2 THE ROLE of PUBLIC OPINION
Public opinion plays an important role in domestic circumstance. Public opinion 
denotes to informed and reactive (whether for or against the decision) groups within 
the state’s domestic hierarchy. This is possible only when the public is able to express 
its reactions, if they are under suppression because of the regime or the leader, then 
this entity will be ineffective. It is usually assumed that a public that supports the 
efforts toward cooperation is a facilatator towards negotiation.
1.3.2.3 THE ROLE OF NGO’s
Non-govemmental organizations are one of the components of the domestic 
system. It can be defined as a group that has gathered around a certain idea (i.e 
environment, women’s rights etc.) or a message (i.e religious,social) to propagate 
their views under the auspices of democracy. In ideal democratic regimes NGO’s 
have impact on the decision making process. They are not linked to the government 
and usually operate independently.' They can support or oppose government policies. 
It is usually assumed that if NGO’s have an impact on the decision making process 
and support the policies for peace, then it will have a facilitating effect on the pre- 
negotiating phase towards conflict termination.
1.3.3 THE LEADER
The leader is the one who decides on the continuation or the termination of the 
war. For that reason it is important to dwell upon the factors which effect this
decision. The factors that will be focused on are: looming disaster, leader change/ 
leadership style, costs outweighing benefits and change in priorities.
1.3.3.1 THE PERCEIVED THREAT OF LOOMING DISASTER
Looming disaster variable denotes to leaders prognasticating a disaster that will be 
costly. It may be an unanticipated surpise attack, or a social unrest that may result in 
the overthrow of the government or more radically, result in an upheaval. When the 
outcomes are as pesimistle as the proposed ones, the leader may be forced into 
revising her current policies of coercion. It is usually assumed that a growing threat 
of a looming disaster will chaimel the leader towards conflict termination strategies.
1.3.3.2 CHANGE IN LEADER/LEADERSHIP STYLE
Change in leader denotes to a change in policies towards peace. A leader who is 
entrapped within her policies of coercion will not be able to change strategies. When 
a new leader takes the lead she may not be entrapped as the previous leader and may 
have the opportunity to alter the policies of coercion. It is usually assumed that a 
change in leader, from one that feels entrapped to one that does not, will facilitate the 
pre-negotiation attempt towards negotiations.
Leadership style, on the other hand denotes to the way that each leader handles the 
conflict. The styles of confronting or resolviag the conflict is unique to the leader 
itself. It is usually assumed that a leader who is desking peace will facilitate the pre­
negotiation efforts toward conflict termination.
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1.3.3.3 COSTS OUTWEIGHING BENEFITS
Costs to a leader can be econoinic such as military expenditures causing 
fluctuations in the economy. It can also be social, where the people may believe that 
the public is sacrificing (i.e fighting,suffering and even dying) for a cause they may 
not care for. Finally the costs may be political, since the dictum for Post-Cold War 
international relations is pacific settlement of disputes, coercion may disperse the 
allies firom the, state and furthermore it may push the state towards isolation in 
international or regional organizations. It is assumed that rising costs and minimized 
benefits are a reason to quit coercion. In some other cases if the party believes that it 
has invested too much to quit, then it will not back down, instead it will try to recover 
its losses by continuing.
1.3.3.4 CHANGE IN PRIORITY
This variable is usually the by-product of previous variables in this category. A 
threatened (i.e looming disaster, rising costs) leader after viewing the situation as no 
win, may decide to revise her policies of coercion. Instead of giving priority to 
destroying the adversary, may modify her priority by turning towards cooperation due 
to economic and political costs. This change in priority, whether inflicted upon or 
voluntary may contribute to peace attempts. It is usually assumed that a change in 
priority that is tilted towards cooperation will usually facilitate the pre-negotiation 
process towards negotiations.
Table 2 presents a summary of the propositions that are suggested for the 
analytical tools.
11
TABLE 2 ; SUMMARY OF THE PROPOSITIONS
PROPOSITION I It is usually assumed that allies that 
support cooperation will facilitate the 
pre-negotiation phase towards conflict 
termination.
PROPOSITION n It is usually assumed that an 
intermediary that brings in extra 
desirable sources will facilitate the 
process towards conflict termination.
PROPOSITION HI It is usually assumed that a systemic 
change, will contribute to peace and 
cooperation since the parties are not 
backed by superpowers.
PROPOSITION IV It is usually assumed that intra-party 
disputes hinder the pre-negotiation 
phase towards conflict termination.
PROPOSITION V It is usually assumed that a public that 
supports the efforts toward cooperation 
will facilitate the pre-negotiation phase 
towards conflict termination.
PROPOSITION VI It is usually assumed that if the NGO’s 
have the pohcies for peace, then it will 
have a facilitating effect on the pre­
negotiation phase towards conflict 
termination.
PROPOSITION VII It is usually assumed that a growing 
threat of looming disaster will channel 
the leader towards conflict termination 
strategies.
PROPOSITION V in It is usually assumed that a leader who 
is desiring peace will facilitate the pre­
negotiation efforts toward conflict 
termination.
PROPOSITION IX It is assumed that rising costs and 
minimized benefits are a reason to quit 
coercion.
PROPOSITION X It is assumed that a change in priority 
win facilitate the pre-negotiation phase 
towards conflict termination.
12
As noted before, in this research the above variables and their propositions 
are used in analyzing the pre-negotiation phase of the two cases. Therefore the 
following chapter involves the analysis of the Pre-Camp David phase of the Egyptian- 
Israeli conflict.
Chapter 3 focuses on the analysis of the Syrian- Israeli conflict in the Post Cold 
War period.
The conclusion chapter introduces the major findings of this study.
13
CHAPTER n
2.1 EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI CONFLICT: 
fflSTORICAL BACKGROUND
The conflict between Egypt and Israel started, when Israel declared its War of 
independence in 1948 and continued up until 1949. Egypt acting in unisom with; 
Transjordan, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon invaded Palestine and attacked Israel. In 
February, Egypt signed an armstice with Israel and the others followed respectively.
The second Arab-Israeli war took place in the Fall of 1956. Egyptian President 
Nasser asked for Soviet military assistance to nationalize the Suez Canal upon which 
both the British and the French acted severely. In a few months the British and the 
French forces secured the control of the Canal enhanced by ahstrikes originating from 
Israel. The Israeli troops withdrew due to pressure coming from Washington. The 
United Nations (UN) got involved in the dispute and sent a multi-national force to 
stahilze the area. The war did not solve the problem, it only changed the balances in 
the region.
In 1967 fearing an imminent attack, Israel decided to strike first. The Six. Day 
War resulted in Israel’s victory, Israel captured; in the north the Golan Heights, all of 
Jordanian territory west of Jordan River, the Sinai, East Jerusalem and Gaza. Israel 
unlike the 1956 war, was in a position of strength. Armstice was signed between the 
two states and a stalemate continued until 1973 under the framework of no-war-no­
peace proposals
After Sadat’s take over in 1970, his insistence on receiving a generous financial 
aid package from the Soviet Union, backfired. The answer was a clear no. Sadat had
14
to adopt different policies . In 1972 he ousted the Soviet military officials out of 
Egypt. The Soviets boycotted the move severely.
In October 1973 another Arab-Israeli war took place. Egypt and Syria, in order to 
recapture the lands lost in 1967, attacked Israel. Israel retaliated against the surprise 
attack and triumphed over both Egypt and Syria. The 1973 October War resulted in 
an US intervention. Kissinger’s shuttle diplomacy ushered in the First and Second 
Sinai Accords. The two accords suggested disengagement and in order to stabilize the 
region the Sinai was to be under the control of a multinational force.
By 1976 Sadat refined his policies . He played with the image of Egypt as a 
moderate Arab state. He desired peace and he made it public. Apart from his 
personal commitment, secret meetings took place. The most important was the 
meeting between the two state officials, namely Dayan and Tuhamy, in Morocco. 
Moshe Dayan presented the Israeli view in stating that Sadat needed to convince the 
Israeli pulic that his offer of peace was genuine. Tuhamy stated that he could not 
make promises for his President but, he would let Sadat know what the Israelis 
desired. Begin and Sadat made seperate trips to Washington but no progress was 
made. At the time of the imminent impasse the Soviet Union and the US publicized 
a joint communique pledging to take part and cooperate in the Middle-East Peace 
Process. The communique translated into the fact that the superpowers would settle 
the Arab- Israeli conflict amongst themselves. Alarmed Sadat organized a trip to 
Jerusalem, which included making a speech ha the Knesset in November 1977. The 
Jerusalem initiative would be an indicator of showing his goodwill and commitment 
to peace.
15
The Jerusalem initiative paved the way to the opening of communication 
channels. The two leaders made seperate trips to Washington but an agreement could 
not be reached. President Jimmy Carter invited the two leaders, this time at the same 
time, to Camp David. After numerous meetings and the US insistence, an accord was 
signed in September 1978. The final agreement, which had already been outlined by 
the Accord, was signed in March 26.1979.
2.2 ANALYSIS
In this section Pre-Camp David phase of the Egyptian- Israeli conflict will be 
analyzed. The previously outlined variables axe used as analytical tools to investigate 
whether these variables contribute or halt the pre-negotiation process towards conflict 
termination.
2.2.1 INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT
The International Context category consists of three variables : role of Allies, 
role of intermediary and finally systemic change.
2.2.1.1 ROLE OF ALLIES 
EGYPT
Egypt being the leader of the most Arab countries, had no difficulty in finding 
allies amongst the Arab states. During Nasser’s rule, Pan-Arabism and Arab 
solidarity towered over any other policy. Nasser also supported the Soviet- Egyptian 
cooperation in international forums.
Sadat’s takeover in 1970 due to Nasser’s death, did not please the Soviet Union. 
Sadat known for his mild policies towards the West, troubled the Soviet counterpart. 
There were doubts that he would adhere to Soviet recommendations but if that 
occured, then aid could be cut and Sadat would come to his senses. No one suspected
16
that Sadat would make the drastic changes of preparing the base for a free market 
economy, promotion of foreign investment, friendlier relations with the US and 
expulsion of Soviet military advisers from Egypt\ Sadat knew that his changes 
would not be received well by his aheady trenched rural population. He made 
promises of improving living conditions and the budget that was set for arms would 
cascade into development and improvement. While doing this he would need to be in 
better relations with previously pushed aside moderate Arab states. New allies meant 
new resources and his policy fine-tuning needed both domestic and international 
support. Some Arab states particularly the rejectionists, would force Egypt towards 
isolation.
The rift between Egypt and the Soviet Union was a golden opportunity for the US. 
As the importance of Soviet help declined, due to the nature of the Cold War era the 
US supported the attempts of overthrowing Soviet influence and compensated Egypt 
financially. Moscow on the other hand, excluded by Kdssinger in 1973 from the 
Middle-East peace moves desperately tried to hold on to the region. Soviet Union 
viewed the Middle- East region as a water borne access to the West and a natural 
buffer against hostile neighbors . Soviet controled oil fields would put pressure on 
Western Europe and US which would contribute to Soviet advantage over the 
Capitalist West.
Saudi Arabia supported Egypt’s drift from the Soviet Union. It was against 
communism filtering through borders especially via Libya. It provided military aid 
to Eg3^ t, to replace worn out Soviet equipment.
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Sudan was a treaty ally of Egypt. It also feared transfers of communism through 
borders . Chad also joined this group since the Soviet threats to its government via 
Libyan provocations was a major concern.
Egypt’s first revisionist policy in changing poles, due to the nature of the Cold- 
War, resulted in loss of some allies but what created a havoc was the next move which 
resulted m an uproar amongst the Arab and Non-Arab states. Sadat desired peace 
between Israel and Egypt which was totally unacceptable to the Islamic world. Both 
rejectionist and moderate Arab states supported the Palestinians and waging war 
against the “artificially created “ state of Israel was viewed as beiog just and almost 
holy‘s.
Morroco supported the secret meetings that went on between the two arch enemies 
and Iran did not commit itself to the raprochement but applauded Sadat privately.
The rejectionist states were Algeria, Libya, Syria, and South Yemen. Iraq decided 
to freeze relations with Egypt Sadat knowing that he could not retract from his 
commitment, reacted vehemently by throwing out their officials out of Egypt.
US supported Egypt from the first point on, change in policies could create a 
never before chance, this chance might result in peace, if both parties were channeled 
into the process. The second concern was that, curbing communist tendencies and 
suffocating Soviet Union in its counter strategies of controlling the oil fields. This 
move would give a hard blow to the superpower and it may not be able to recuperate.
Sadat’s change of policy changed the distribution of the allies. The moderate 
Arab states supported Egypt’s change of heart towards communism but when it came 
down to reaching an agreement with Israel especially over the Palestinian issue, they 
were negligent in contributing to the peace efforts. After Sadat signed the Camp
had resoxirces which Eiorope depended on, and an untimely boycott would result in a 
regional crisis which could entrap the West by cutting supplies.
The Jewish Lobby which was extremely influential both in the House of 
Representatives and the Congress cleared the way to aides and assistance and due to 
the presumptions Jewish population, the US always backed Israel in international 
forums.
Apart from the Jewish population, the US interest in the region based itself on two 
pillars: balancing the spread Soviet influence in the region and having access to 
natural resources which were vital to its existence. With such grave interests in the 
region the US had to back Israel in the Arab- Israeli conflict.
The US was a natural ally to Israel and almost 70% of the Israeli economy based
n
itself on US aid . It was apparent to the Israelis that aid and political assistance 
would result in pressure when it came to making peace . The Likud government 
rejected any kind of pressure which would threaten Israeli security for the sake of 
peace.
Israel although an independent state in the middle of Arab states, neeeded 
constant and continuous support from the US in order to survive in the region. It was 
a state that was not recognized by its neighbors and therefore its terrritorial integrity 
was constantly assaulted. Without the economic and political backing of the US, the 
state of Israel might have perished after its creation. The Likud government and 
therefore Begin resisted peace efforts that was first ushered in by the US and then by 
Sadat. Nonetheless, the risks were too great to drift away from a foster parent in a 
region where the precarious balance could change at any moment towards Israel’s 
disadvantage.
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The US push towards peace is certainly a facilitator for Israel to loosen the tight 
grip of Likud foreign policy maneuvers towards Egypt. Begin unlike Sadat did not 
have much allies to lose but loss of a partner could pose drastic effects on Israel.
2.2.1.2 ROLE OF INTERMEDIARY
EGYPT
The UN is the first intermediary that takes part in the conflict. It looses its 
credibility when Israel denoimces its resolutions as being one sided .
The US is the major intermediary that took the role as a state. Its leverage and 
therefore extensive bargaining power (politically and financially) with the parties was 
copius.
Sadat hoped that pressure coming from the US would force Begin to compromise,
g
so he prefered not to appear in the limelight and waited until Begin yielded . Begin 
on the other hand, had a commitment to his people, he promised them fbe Biblical 
lands of Judea and Samaria, and under in no circumstance they could be surrendered. 
Peace with the Arab states was to be viewed sceptically. Sadat’s conciliatory gestures 
would have to convince the Israelis that he was willing to recognize Israel and would 
do anything in his power to normalize the relations between the two states.
The American pohcy in the Middle-East had four objectives: ensuring the security 
of Israel, achieving an Arab -Israeli peace settlement, maintaining US and Western 
access to Middle Eastern oil and blocking Soviet expansionism in the region. The
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US enjoyed being the stabilizer and filled the role of mediator^. In spite of its close 
ties with Israel it maintained relations with nearly all Arab countries and US 
diplomats gained access throughout the region^° .
By 1977 it was widely accepted that the US was the key player outside the 
participants in the Middle-East conflict. ’’The U.S holds 99 percent of the cards” 
Sadat said repeatedly^\ In 1977 the Arabs initiated a major diplomatic effort to 
persuade the US that the Arabs no longer resisted the existence of Israel but only 
condemned the 1967 occupation of Arab lands and its refusal to recognize 
“Palestinian Rights”
The US starting from the ‘TTo-war, no-peace “ stalemate tried to be a go 
between the parties but in October 1973, Syria and Egypt launched a surprise attack 
on Israel. The Israelis knowing that if the first blow came jSrom their offensive troops 
the U.S would not offer assistance. Despite the surprise attack Israel recovered and in 
order to avoid further defeat and humiliation of the Arabs the US and the Soviet 
Union pressed for a cease fire. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger shuttled between 
the two parties and negotiated a cease fire agreement in December 1973. Afterwards 
Sinai I and 11 accords were signed.
The United States due to its outlined interests in the region, displayed concern 
over the Arab-Israeli dispute. The heedful tactic of segregating Soviet Union from 
the region yet not alarming it by extending an invitation for the Geneva Negotiations 
proved that the US was manipulating the process and the region.. With Kissinger’s 
efforts, the US maintained its role as an honest broker and improved its relations with 
the Arab world as a result .
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The commitment to peace in exchange for financial compensation was the 
facilitating factor for the US in achieving its commitment. Its indisputable leverage 
containing both political and economic assistance made risks more appealing to both 
parties. The intermediary facilitated the process leading to formal negotiations.
ISRAEL
Israel never accepted the UN resolutions so right from the start the idea of UN as 
an intermediary was rejected. It also rejected intemational conferences and prefered 
one to one talks with the US which would strengthen the Israeli position that they 
would not appear as giving major concessions to an adversary but as working with a 
partner to solve a problem. The Biblical lands, Judea and Samaria (West Bank and 
Gaza) are part of the “Promised Lands” and they can never be negotiated over^ "^ . With 
this in mind, Israel’s peace offer would include a bi-national state but not a seperate 
state of Palestine. The Golan Heights and Sinai cordd be discussed but Gaza and the 
West Bank were out of question^^.
The US had a very delicate role to play. At one side there was a new ally which 
had to be protected, at the other a recalcitrant state which refused to have talks with 
the Arab states. The US also had to worry about the Soviet Union which was 
becoming more and more influential in the region. The Arab states already irritated 
by the generosity towards Israel, preferred to see the Soviet Union as an ally.
The US facilitated the process towards negotiations. Israel would be making 
peace with an Arab state which was the leader in the region, recogniton from the 
leader would create the cascading effect for the remaining states, which might be 
persuaded into coming to peaceful terms with Israel. It would receive political
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opportunities, compensations of aid, intelligence and these gains would sustain the 
criticism arising from the oppositon and the public.
2.2.1.3 SYSTEMIC CHANGE
The global system that dominated the international arena at the time of the dispute 
was the bi-polar system, where the allies were glued to one another in a give and take 
relationship. The status quo hardly changed and rarely there were movements from 
one block to the other. There are no drastic changes between the relationship of the 
two major states. There were regional disputes which ran the risk of inviting nuclear 
confrontation. Each superpower gave support to one party and the remaining states 
grouped around one or the other.
In the Arab-Israeli conflict; the Soviet Union appeared to promise war at the cost 
of achieving freedom, therefore supported the Arab thesis of liberation of the 
Palestinians at the cost of Israeli destruction and form a state of Palestine.
The US believed in achieving peace while putting an end to Soviet advancement 
in the Middle East, which undoubtedly resulted in supporting the newly fostered state 
of Israel. This meant unpopularity for the US in the region because it was to back an 
isolated state which was charged with grabbing land and assimilating the non-Israelis. 
It was to be one against a whole region and Soviet Union which was backed up by the 
regional states and their organizations.
The Soviet pressure to take part in the Geneva conference proved that they did not 
want to be excluded from the process. Any attempt of US taking part meant that the 
Soviets had to be there too. Israel had aheady rejected to take part in an international 
conference because nothing would change. It would involve the same issues, and 
same views, more than enough participants, each pressing for their own interest, and
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therefore nothing would be solved. Joint American Soviet communique paved the 
way towards peace since none of the parties could have enough backing from its 
superpower counterpart if the superpowers collaborated. It was the right time to act 
for Sadat before it was too late.
The bi-polar system made it almost impossible to have a decent dialogue between 
the conflicting parties. It was extremely difficult to regionalize a conflict without 
making it an international issue.
The systemic change variable was not applicable for neither Egypt nor Israel.
2.2.2 DOMESTIC CIRCUMSTANCE
As noted in the previous chapter the variables that will be investigated rmder 
domestic circumstance are effect of intra-party disputes, role of public opinion and 
role of NGO’s. It is needless to say that intra-party disputes will tower over the rest. 
Public opinion is not extinct but dormant mder the suppression of the Sadat regime 
especially after the revival of the fundamentalist groups. Finally in this restraining 
climate it is hard to notice non-governmental organizations.
The Eg)q)tian decision making process revolved aroimd the leader or the president. 
He appeared to be surrounded by other institutions such as the parliament, army and 
the public itself but what was essential was that the president had the privilege of 
acting alone despite constituencies and supervision mechanisms.
Israeli domestic pohcies were no different than its Egyptian cormterpart. The 
Israeli government was less restraining than the Sadat government. The two parties 
Likud and Labor represented two different layers of the society. The Likud had 
elements from the Herut party in which Menachem Begin was the leader. Herat was 
the party that represented the older generation, the early settlers and promotion of
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Zionism. In a way Herat represented the commitment to religion and solidarity of all 
Jews in the world, it was the extreme right within the right. The Labor party travelled 
in a more acquiescent political line. It was made up by Jews who had come to Israel 
from Europe after World War II . They believed that peace was possible through 
compromise.
The Lhcud had no intention of giving up the Biblical lands such as Gaza Strip 
and the West Bank . The Golan Heights and the Sinai peninsula were strategically 
important land marks but both Gaza and West Bank were irreplacable.
Labor, due to its more secular mandate, adhered to principles like social justice 
and equal distrubution of wealth which meant nothing was indisputable and to them, 
Israel could not continue to be the isolated victim of the Middle-East. Peace had to be 
achieved may be not with every state that was in a dispute with Israel, but at least with 
the ones that were willing to cooperate.
It is worthwhile to note that the peace seeds were planted during the Labor party 
government, but sowed when the Likud was in power. Begin’s suprise victory during 
the May elections in 1977 gave signals of retraction on the peace process. The intra­
party disputes were immense when the US started to put pressure on Israel. There is 
no viable evidence that NGO’s were present. Finally public opinion seemed to be 
divided between the two parties. There was no consensus on whether or not peace 
was desired.
2.2.2.1 INTRA- PARTY DISPUTE 
EGYPT
Sadat’s desire for peace did not find many supporters, particularly vice-president 
Mubarak who opposed it continuosly. For Sadat it was bad enough that he had to
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overcome public pressure and he knew that without the backing from his party his 
revolutionary principles would not go far from being viewed as a dream. He had to 
overcome recalcitrant Foreign Affairs advisers^^. What appeared to be a dead lock 
was that Sadat rarely got a glimpse of what the populace demanded in terms of 
absorbing peace with Israel. His aides supported his decisions at the risk of not losing 
their positions due to some unhappy experiences. Mubarak screened out the public 
demands and only transmited the views that were in accordance with his own .
The intra-party or more appropriately, the interpersonal dispute between Sadat and 
Mubarak is a hinderance towards the formal negotiations. Egypt’s decision making 
mechanism revolved around Sadat, therefore he did not have to change his policies 
due to growing opposition.
ISRAEL
Begin came to power in 1977 with promises of continiiing the Zionist crusade 
and reclaiming the longtime trampled Israeli honor. When Sadat started to send his 
peace feelers around, he knew that he might end up empty handed, but to his suprise 
he perceived that if both parties gave proposals for their view of peace then 
similarities could be drawn and this could be a starting point.
The secret meeting between Dayan and Tuhamy took place in December 1977. 
Deputy Prime Minister Tuhamy and Israeli Foreign Minister Dayan met in 
Morocco where the two officials exchanged views. Tuhamy insisted that withdrawal 
from the occupied territories was essential and PLO terrorism can be curbed only if 
Soviet Union was kept out of the process. The West Bank could be linked to Jordan 
and Saudi Arabia. Dayan listened to the proposals but was negligent in commiting 
himself^*.
27
Begin rejected the land-for-peace proposals from the start. His insistency never 
diminished. He did not want to lose face at home so he approved of the pre­
negotiation being secret and requested from his partner that details of such meetings 
to be screened from the press.
The mellowness in Begin’s policy did not appear at its own will. The US 
pressure, after Sadat’s willingness to compromise, had increased. He also knew that if 
the setting was right a treaty with Sadat would be beneficial to Israel.' Egypt was the 
leader of the Arab states and if Sadat chose to make peace, then other states would 
follow in his footsteps. A peace loving and peaceful Israel would satisfy the US and 
the international arena, would have to accept Israel as a partner. A peace agreement 
with Egypt would mean recognition to Israel and direct breach to the Security Coimcil 
Resolutions 242 and 338 which prohibited Israel’s existence in the Middle-East^^. 
Letting go of the Sinai would insure West Bank and the Gaza, afterall it would appear 
as though Israel had broken its recalcitrant attitude and the rest would be up to the 
other states. Israel would complete its part of the deal.
For Begin, the war was just beginning. He had to convince the cracked voices that 
were already causing echoes in the Knesset. He was still adamant on the territorial 
integrity of Israel, condeming a seperate state of Palestine but flexible on issues hke 
water, economic cooperation and political partnership. That was the best offer he 
could give, both to his party and to Egypt.
The intra-party dispute that was experienced during the peace attemp was 
definitely a hinder towards achieving the peace. It limited the flexibility of Begin 
when the actual bargaining took place at Camp David. At a certain point when a
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deadlock was reached the aides, ministers and deputy ministers went through tit for tat 
process.
2.111  ROLE OF PUBLIC OPINION 
EGYPT
In 1977 the Islamic Brotherhood tried to overthrow the Sadat government, Sadat 
replied by hunting down anti-government supporters. Socially he also faced a down 
hill turn when he wanted to implement the Infitah which was a policy to encourage 
jfree enterprise but it did not provide the economic progress that it had promised . 
This error gave rise to the growth of the Islamic Fundamentalist movement . The 
rural poor was being irritated by the urban aristocracy and unavoidably they started 
to support the Islamic fundamentalists. The military, while supporting Sadat was also 
cautious of the uneasy gestures of the populace they may have been silent but they 
reacted by clinging on their religion in the most radical way. A peace with Israel 
would only mean defiance of belief and treason to the nation. With the 
fundamentalist movement creeping up firom behind, Sadat had no option but to find an 
antidote against fundamentalism. This meant rejuvenating the Wafd party which was 
known to be one of the ultra nationalistic parties which ironically was silenced by 
SadafV
Sadat was more succesful in attaining peace with Israel than prosperity for 
Egypt . Despite the social unrest Sadat achieved his goal. When he encountered 
opposition, like Nasser, he adopted oppresive measures. Public opinion was a 
hinderance towards peace because the public felt betrayed in the sense that they had 
sacrificed but their gains were not percievable. The public could not express their 
distress since political liberation meant disagreeing to policies put forward by Sadat.
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ISRAEL
The Israeli public opinion was more informed and active about the changes toward 
the peace. The Likud takeover was a surprise but this did not guarantee a total 
support for the party. After the elections, Likud formed coaliton with Democratic 
Movement for Change, which fostered extensive nationalistic tendencies, and some 
ultra religious parties. Begin at first point had to appease the rightest section of Likud 
(the Herut faction) and then work on the coalition so that his decisions would be 
backed afterall a peace without a ratification meant no peace at all.
The one sure thing about the public opinion was that no one desired war anymore 
but at the same time giving up the occupied territories was unthinkable. For Begin it 
was a balancing act, the armstice signed in 1973 had to be finalized but hi a way that 
did not harm Israeli security or his political future. Gush Eminum ( Bloc of the 
Faithful) Orthodox religious pressure group reminded him of his commitment to 
Zionism^^.
The effect of public opinion was neither a help nor a hinderance towards peace 
because there was no strong reaction for or against peace. It is evaluated as being 
neutral. It may have caused some difficulties for Begin to implement some of his 
policies smoothly but nonetheless, it did not create obstacles as the intra-party 
disputes that took place.
2.2.2.3 ROLE OF NGO’S
EGYPT
There are no apparent signs of NGO’s or pressure groups that may have taken 
part during the dispute. Whether or not there was a need for an NGO is doubtable .
30
Due to the nature of the political stratum, it is apparent that even if there were 
NGO’s, they could not function under the rule of Sadat. His drastic changes required 
indisputable adherence to the new policies, deviations were to be punished.
International NGO’s may have been involved but again due to the closely knit 
structure of one-man-one- rule structure of Egyptian politics they may have not been 
welcomed.
ISRAEL
There is no evidence that there were NGO’s taking role during the dispute, pre­
negotiation and during the agreement. Even, if they were present they may have not 
been actively involved. The only difference from the Egyptian case is that these kinds 
of establishments were not suppressed but perhaps the public did not give them the 
support that they needed to nourish in.
The international NGO’s also appear to be dormant during the time period of the 
dispute up to the point when the accords were signed. It may be inferred that the 
NGO’s had no effect on the facilitation or the hinderance of the negotiation reaching 
an agreement.
2.2.3 THE LEADER
In this category the four variables that are investigated are; the threat of looming 
disaster, leader change / leadership style, costs outweighing benefits and change in 
priority. This category gives a closer look at why the leaders themselves decided to 
pursue for peace rather than wage war.
2.2.3.1 THREAT OF LOOMING DISASTER
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Threat of looming disaster variable denotes to a leader prograstinating that a 
disaster such as; an unanticiapted surprise attack or a social unrest which may result in 
the overthrow of the government.
EGYPT
There is no evidence that threat of looming disaster variable was present in this 
conflict. Therefore this variable was not applicable in the Egyptian case.
ISRAEL
There is no indicator that this variable was present in the Israeli case either. Again 
this variable was not applicable.
2.2.3.2 LEADER CHANGE / LEADERSHIP STYLE 
EGYPT
Sadat’s takeover from Nasser meant a drift from the Soviet Union. He also did not 
believe that Egypt should be the leader of the Arab world. He believed in Egypt and 
Egyptian interests rather than the grand strategy of leading the way to the Arab 
states. He saw the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as being important but it was not an 
impediment in reaching an agreement between Egypt and Israel. The US and Saudi 
Arabia, being one of the more moderate Arab states, provided the assistance that 
Soviet Union had declined. Sadat did not plan to make a drastic change in his 
relations with the Arab states, he only turned to the more moderate states and tried to 
keep the rejectionists at a certain distance.
Sadat tookover an economy which gave signals of bankruptcy due to the war with 
Israel. Since every investment was funneled into the millitary and industry, social
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reforms never took place. Infitah had been presented as a savior, free enterprise 
promised welfare and prosperity. The result was chaos, the aristocracy in the urban 
areas particularly in Cairo seemed to benefit from the changes but the rural poor 
remained poor and seemed more desperate than ever. Under the circumstance the 
decision to continue to fight, which was what the Soviet Union was dictating to its 
compatriots, involved incalculable risks. The US on the other hand urged the parties 
to overcome their differences, if not accentuate, the common points and reach an 
agreement.
The social unrest and the financial incapability to cope with stagnation made 
peace a better deal for Sadat. This was to insure his political future as a president, 
although there were attemps of overthrowing his government, and on cutting down 
costs while receiving enticing compensation from the US.
Sadat was a definite plus towards formal negotiations. Change in leader and his 
leadership style were one of the major turning points in coming towards the Camp 
David summit.
ISRAEL
Begin chosen for his uncompromising nature and commitment to Zionism looked 
as if though the peace process would be disturbed. The previous government had 
been much more permissive towards its neighbors and to an extent to its enemies. He 
commited himself to his public’s wish, not to surrender territory at any cost. In order 
to reach this goal he would keep away from all kinds of peace moves and blame the
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US for pressuring Israel '^ .^ With this kind of an outlook the neighbors were in a 
despair. The long awaited peace would never arrive.
What was appealing to Begin was that after the secret meeting between the two 
states he found Egypt cooperative and predisposed. If Egypt wanted the peace then 
Sadat worxld be prepared to exchange it for something else. Recognition was what 
Israel had been after and if Egypt recognized Israel, being the leader of the Arab states 
and the Middle-East, perhaps others would follow. Furthermore Israel would strip 
away from its uncompromising and snatching land identity.
Change in policy did not mean change in principle or mandate. Begin looked as if 
he was contributing to the peace but peace had to have a price for Sadat. The Israeli 
public would demand an explaination and the answer would be given.
There would be no change in the status of West Bank or Gaza and a seperate state 
for the Palestinians would be out of the agenda. Furthermore Israel would decide on 
what to negotiate and what not to. The peace attempt would limit the agenda for a 
comprehensive Middle-East peace but for the time being it would have to be only 
offered or accepted for Egypt.
The leader change was a positive variable towards peace despite Begin’s 
commitment towards the conservatives. He saw peace as an opportunity to achieve 
national goals in a more cooperative way. Peace did not pertain to concessions, it 
meant opening channels of communication and at the same time getting a glimpse of 
what the adversary was preparing for.
2.2.3.3 COSTS OUTWEIGHING BENEFITS
EGYPT
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After the 1973 war, it was apparent that any assault against Israel would be 
punished severely. The Sinai had already been lost and because of this, the military 
had its weakspot, any land movement, from the Sinai could threaten Cairo 
unexpectedly. The Egyptian army was on alert for pre-emptive attacks from the Sinai.
Even if one thought of the best outcome, which would be to get the Sinai back, to 
annihilate Israel was not as easy as once believed. Getting the Sinai back by fighting 
required financial assistance and the Soviet Union was already becoming ungenerous 
towards Egypt ever since Nasser’s death. Sinai had to be taken back ifthisw asnot 
achieved the future of the Sadat government would be indefinite.
Even if the Sinai was taken back , with the inflation rate racing to the top, it 
would be a Pyrric victory. The costs of winning back the Sinai would definitely 
outweigh the benefits. A crippled economy and an unstable political arena would 
signal to Israel that Cairo is not too far away from Jerusalem. Sinai had to be under 
Egyptian rule but not by war, by peace. Sadat could not afford to lose time or money 
in this matter. He had to act quick and at once.
The costs of going to war definitely outweighed the benefits. For that reason, it 
was a facilitator towards deciding to cooperate.
ISRAEL
Begin’s decision to have talks would be kept a secret. The Israeli public opinion 
showed variations towards peace but firm on one point, no territory was to be handed 
over. After the 1967 and the 1973 wars Israel had occupied lands that had both 
strategic and moral value to its adversaries and to an extent to the US. It proved that 
if the armstice had not been made, Cairo would not have been too far away from
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Jerusalem. Even under the pressure of the neighboring Arab states and the Soviet 
Union, Israel could pursue the goals that was set by its founding fathers.
The costs would not outweigh the benefits at this juncture since Israel had a better 
position and therefore more bargaining power than its adversary. This variable might 
not have facilitated the peace pre-negotiation attempts toward a peace agreement. The 
only obstacle was that the status quo was more costly to Israel because it was difficult 
for Begin to return the Sinai in installments .
The costs of continuing coercion were too great to bare, considering the fact that 
there were many too fight and only one to cooperate. If coercion continued then, the 
Israeli population would cease to be. It was a definite facilitator towards formal 
negotiations.
2.2.3.4 CHANGE IN PRIORITIES
EGYPT
For Egypt, with the policy change due to the social and financial instabilities, the 
priorities had also changed. It was to get out of the war puzzle with no damage and 
achieve peace which would bring some positive outcomes so that the public can be 
satified.
The peace between Israel and Egypt did not have to include other Arab states their 
participation may create obstacles for Egypt both internationally and domestically. 
The PLO issue would be mentioned but Sadat knew that a comprehensive agreement 
for an Arab-Israeli conflict would be premature. This would only be a first step 
towards reaching an agreement with the long time enemy. It would show that peace 
is possible through negotiations.
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Change in priorities linked to costs outweighing benefits was a facilitator towards 
negotiations.
ISRAEL
Begin saw concession, as being plausible. This would be the insurance policy 
against the Arab world not recognizing Israel. The international organizations would 
no longer condemn it for being hostile and uncompromising and finally the step 
towards peace, would disentangle the US aid that would be blocked in the Senate .
War against the Arab states was not beneficial for Israel. Afierall Israel was 
surrounded by mifriendly neighbors and no matter how much aid was provided or 
what military victory was gained, it wordd still be the same equation, one against 
many.
If Israel was to cooperate, then this would mean assistance for compensation. 
The US being the biggest shareholder in this peace attempt, would not be frugal while 
distributing aid. Economic assistance followed by military intelligence exchange 
would be a motivation force for Israel. The political assistance would secure the 
implementation of any peace attempt since the US would be there to protect its 
artifact. As a result, assistance for concessions would be desirable for both sides.
The variable of change in priorities is a definite facilitator towards an agreement. 
Financial assistance becomes more desirable than adherence to party mandates and 
election promises. Concession will be rewarded so the leader is not viewed as a 
traitor but a skillful negotiator. Israel’s security is not at risk since military aid and 
intelligence exchange will be provided.
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2.3 CONCLUSION
In this section an overview of the outcomes of the variables of the Egyptian-Israeli 
conflict is given. A summary of the effect of the variables on the Pre-Camp David 
phase of the Egytian- Israeli conflict is presented in Table 3.
As an overview it can be inferred that the category which contributed most to 
facilitation of pre-negotiation attempts towards conflict termination was the leader. 
Its three variables out of the four acted as definite facilitators. The category which was 
a hinder was the domestic circumstance.
EGYPT
The leader category with, leader change/ leadership style, costs outweighing 
benefits and change in priorities, contributed to the Egyptian- Israeli conflict as 
facilitators towards conflict termination. The threat of looming disaster variable was 
not applicable for Egypt.
The domestic circumstance category was a hinder towards conflict termination. 
Intra-party dispute and public opinion variables were hinderances toward conflict 
termination. The variable of NGO’s was not applicable.
The international context is placed as being neutral because while the variable of 
role of allies functions as a hinderance, the intermediary variable is a facilitator. 
Systemic change is not applicable.
In total Egypt came in contact with four facilitating, three hindering, and three not 
applicable results from the analysis. Since there is no great diffference in the result 
of facilitators and the hinderances, it can be inferred that Egypt did not arrive at peace 
in a consensus.
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ISRAEL
The category that contributed to facilitation of conflict termination is the category 
of the leader. The three variables leader change/ leadership style, costs outweighing 
benefits, change in priorities contributed as facilitators. The threat of looming disaster 
variable was not applicable.
The hindering category appears to be the domestic circumstance because this is 
the only point where a hindering effect presents itself. The intra-party dispute is a 
hinderance. The public opinion is neutral. The NGO variable is not applicable.
As a total, Israel came in contact with five facilitating and one hindering variable. 
There were three not applicable variables and one variable was neutral. There is a 
definite difference between the facilitating and opposing variables, therefore it can be 
inferred that Israel was supportive of the peace attempts more adamantly than Egypt.
The following chapter will present an analysis of the Post Cold War period of the 
Syrian-Israeli conflict.
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TABLE 3 THE EFFECTS OF VARIABLES ON THE 
EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI CONFLICT
INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT
■ROLE of AI|dES ROLE of 
INTERMEDIARY
SYSTEMIC 
CHANGE ; , ;
EGYPT - + N/A
ISRAEL + + N/A
DOMESTIC CIRCUMSTANCE
EFFECT of
INTRA-Party
m SP O T E
:ROLE of PUBHG 
:OPI№ON
Ip L E  of NGO's :
EGYPT - - N/A
ISRAEL - 0 N/A
LEADER
THREAT of
ilB oM iP G  . ■ ■ > 
DISASTER
LEADER
CHAN(3E\
l e a d e r s h ir : 
S T ^ :  ^
COSTS: 
OUTW ElGffi 
^  ' 
pBNKFITS;;
CHANGE IN : 
PRIORITY
EGYPT N/A + + +
ISRAEL N/A + +
+ ; Facilitating effect
: Hindering effect 
0 : Neutral
N/A : Not Applicable.
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CHAPTER III
3.1 SYRIAN-ISRAELI CONFLICT: 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The case for Syria and Israel had a different dimension from the conflict between 
Egypt and Israel. The conflict between Syria and Israel may have started almost 
about the same period and same reason, reclaiming a captured territory, but it has not 
finalized in an agreement as in the case of Egyptian- Israeli dispute. The solutions or 
attempts of resolving the conflict, if at all is possible, lie between the leaders and their 
willingness to cooperate, without their determination, the Syrian track of the Arab- 
Israeli conflict will remaui a callus that will threaten the region’s stability over and 
over again.
The relations between Syria and Israel had never been good. Syria like its 
compatriots viewed Israel as an enemy orbit which was a puppet of Western 
exploiters and it was a serious threat toward Arab solidarity and regional stability.
In June 1967 Israel took hold of the Occupied lands which included the Golan 
Heights. In 1973 the fighting continued, the Syrians could not regain the Golan 
Heights but they believed that “they fought courageously”^
After Assad’s takeover, Syria posed more of an isolationist policy towards its 
radical Moslem brothers, fearing rejuvenation of repressed Simni majority. The 
Soviet Union supported Syria and any state in the Middle East which posed an interest 
in the Palestinian issue. The Arab- Israeli conflict was the key to the region both of
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the superpowers took great interest in the conirontation but none was interested in 
resolving i t
In 1975 a civil war broke out in Lebanon between the rightist Christians and leftist 
Moslem and Palestinian guerillas. This war paved the way to American supported 
Israeli intervention in 1976 .^ Two years later Israel invaded southern Lebanon which 
had sheltered the Palestinian guerillas. Israel claimed that the intervention was 
neccesary to curb the infiltrating terrorists from Lebanon. Syria claimed that it was an 
invasion and sent a force to the troubled region few weeks after the Israeli invasion. 
In June 1976 a contingent force sent by the UN came to Lebanon, Israeli forces 
returned back. In June 1982 Israel invaded southern Lebanon once again to clean out 
the Palestinians in the region. The UN forces left Lebanon in 1984 but the Israeli 
army remained firm. Syrian forces left in May 1991 after the signing of an agreement 
between the two states.
The end of the Iran- Iraq war changed the dynamics in the region. Saddam who 
had been supported by the US reigned as the leader who could pose a future threat to 
the region since he came out as the victor. Iran especially after Humeyni’s takeover 
had been supported by the Soviet Union and therefore Syria also placed itself in this 
block. During the war Syria and Israel faced each other, not militarily but from 
different blocks.
Superpower configurations signalled challenges at the end of 1980’s. The Soviet 
Union was having a difficult time adapting to Gorbachev’s revolutionary policies. It 
collapsed, leaving the Kremlinoligists in shock who could have never predicted such 
an end.
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In August 1990 Saddam, making use of the window of opportunity at the time, 
invaded Kuwait Every state was interested in what went wrong in the Soviet Empire, 
no one took notice of the changes taking place in the Middle-East. The invasion 
posed a direct threat to Israel and an indirect threat to every state that was in the 
region. Saddam’s military capacity could not be calculated. The air raids to Israel 
signalled the US government to take charge.
Syria without the Soviet support was weak and had the risk of being attacked 
since it had supported Iran during the previous war. Assad also posed a threat to 
Saddam because he too had the substantial to be the leader of the Arab world. Assad 
chose to be with the Allied powers and for the first time he was in the same block as 
Israel.
Saddam’s defeat was a precaution to the US some sort of a peace bar! to be 
reached in order to prevent future Saddams. The Arab-Israeli conflict had to be dealt 
with in order to have a stabile region which met the US foreign policy criteria.
US president Bush and Secretary of State Baker launched a peace attempt which 
came to life with Baker’s shuttle diplomacy. An international conference was held in 
Madrid 1991. For the first time all of the concerned parties faced each other. Rather 
than taking the conflict as a whole it was seperated into tracks and every track 
consisted of only two parties.
The Syrians left the talks claiming that this conference was not held under the 
auspices of the UN (there was only a representative from the UN) but of the US. The 
precondition of Israeli withdrawal from the golan Heights was not met and finally 
Secxirity Coxincil Resolutions of 242 and 338 were also breached since this 
withdrawal did not come to life.
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The newly elected Rabin government gave priority to “land for peace” rather than 
“peace for peace”. Israel could compromise as long as Assad defined peace and 
showed some good will towards cooperation. Land can be exchanged for peace only 
if security needs were coupled with diplomatic breakthroughs (formal recogoition, 
openning of embassies, trade relations).
The negotiations continued until 1994. Israel proposed a normalization period and 
a gradual withdrawal period. Syria accepted the proposal but they could not agree on 
the time table and the extent of demilitarization.
Rabin’s assasination in November 1995 and Labor defeat in the June 1996 early 
elections slowed down the process of negotiations toward an agreement
3.2 ANALYSIS
3.2.1 INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT
The international context in which the Syrian-Israeli case took place was much 
more challenging than the previous one, challenging in the sense that the Cold Peace 
had replaced the Cold War but this transition did not guarantee a polar’less( from bi­
polarity to multi-polarity) international system. The second Gulf War against Iraq 
shaped the structure of tightly knit patchwork of allies. Syria had to revise its 
policies.
It is obvious that in the category of international context the overarching variables 
are the allies and the systemic change but it is worth mentioning that the intermediary, 
namely the US also played an important role. Clinton’s tactics of alternating carrots 
and sticks were effective on both of the stubom leaders. The Intermediary preserved
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its interest in the region and exercised its irreplacable political and economic 
influence over the parties.
3.2.1.1 ROLE OF ALLIES
SYRIA
Syria, after the demise of the Soviet Union, had to invest in new allies. Its 
previous allies had been the Soviet Union, Eastern European coxmtries and most Arab 
states. As the Soviet assistance in both political and economic arenas declined, Syria 
preferred close relations with Washington and Cairo. It is ironic that the same state 
had dislegitimized the Camp David Accords, opposed making peace with Israel and 
pushed Egypt into isolation. Syria being a secular and a secterian state did not have 
the backing of conservative Arab states, this was the time to gain their support too . 
The residual relationship with the Soviet Union had to be kept and the alliance with 
Iran could be cultivated. Assad had no intention of becoming an orbit of the US and 
joining forces with the Gulf States some precautions had to be taken and Iran was part 
of this act'^ . Assad supported Iran and the Hizballa in Lebanon and several other 
millitant groups against Israel^ during the first Gulf War. In 1989 Syria renewed 
diplomatic relations with Egypt and sensed that a dialogue with Washington depended 
on a milder view towards the Arab-Israeli dispute^. The only concern would be that 
the largest proportion of S5oia’s external finance originated from its oil-rich Arab 
neighbors . Syria’s economic dependence on high levels of grant aid and oil imported 
from Iran has had important consequences for its economic performance. After the
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intervention in Lebanon the grants dropped, due to its dependence Assad had to rely 
on its oil rich allies and its stance on the proposed Arab-Israeli peace was severe*. For 
Syria to act without the guarantee of the US would be suicide, therefore 
compensations had to be high. In 1980’s Assad decided to revise Ba’thist policies of 
isolationism in the region with the declining rate of grants and aids, forming alliances 
was the most pragmatic solution to economic worries.
The end of the first Gulf War signalled that Iraq and Saddam were becoming 
dominant in the region. This irritated the oil rich countries of the Gulf, Saddam 
questioned their legitamacy and their positions toward Iraq. His policy towards Syria 
was to eliminate it and become the sole power in the Middle-East. The tool for this 
objective was to galvanize the dormant Syrian opposition towards the government.
Syria chose to stand tall agauist Saddam with giving support to the allies. Assad 
predicted that his move of cooperation and his new image of collaborating with the 
international actors would be rewarded generously. The US would no longer attack 
Syria as being incooperative and unwilling to be flexible towards a peace agreement. 
The Gulf states would also be thankful since Saddam posed a great threat to their very 
existence. Assad lost the support of most of the Arab states since he ordered to fight 
against an Arab state but the Gulf states and the US compensated his loss as he had 
hoped®. The sepond Gulf War created new opportunities for Assad and it ended his 
isolation in the region. It formed the basis for a Egyptian-Syrian alliance and 
participation in talks for new security arrangements led to over two billion dollars 
worth of aid from Saudia Arabia'®. Apparently despite the fact of siding with his arch 
enemy during the Gulf War, Assad came out with a better hand then when he had 
joined with the Allied powers".
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Good relations with the US would place Syria in a stronger position since the 
Bush adminstration did not believe in the superiority of the Israeli policies in the 
region. With proper backing from the US, Israel would be pushed to a comer and 
therefore would be forced to make peace with Syria on Syrian terms.
The allies or most effectively the US facilitated Syria into thinking more seriously 
about peace with Israel. Peace did not denote to giving concessions, instead it 
pretained to cooperation on issues receving the benefits of looking through the same 
hour glass. If Syria’s Cold War allies had not been replaced by the US, then they 
may have hindered the process towards negotiations. The Arab argument was that 
formation of Palestine was cmcial but only at the cost of destructing the state of 
Israel. Syria’s departure from this dictum irritated the rapprochement with Jordan. 
Nevertheless support from the US and better relations with Israel could promote the 
revival of Greater Syria . Role of allies, since US is the most prominent ally after the 
Cold War, contributed as a facilitator towards conflict termination.
ISRAEL
The state of Israel, ever since its early years, benefitted from being a natural ally to 
the US. The only, times when the relations deteriotated was when the Likud was in 
charge. Likud propogated that over-dependence to the US would take the Israelis 
away from their adherence to Zionism^^. The change in the international system did 
not cause turbulances in the delicate relationship between the allies but domestic 
politics and mandate differences amongst parties, at times caused some disturbances. 
This toppled with the Bush administation’s non-favoring or neutral policy towards 
Isreal resulted in agitations between the two governments.
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After the second Gulf War the Bush administration pushed Israel towards 
attending an inemational conference under the sponsorship of the US to discuss issues 
of dispute amongst the states in the Middle East. Shamir preferred to take each track 
seperately and slowly, the precedent did not have to be the Palestinian issue,it could 
be Syria.
Jordan, though King Hussein never commited himself to formal agreements 
appeared to be in good relations with Israel . Israel in return viewed the Hashemite 
family as a natural buffer against the radical Islamist states^ "^ . More importantly 
Hussein had the potential to agree to Shamir on most terms since this track was one of 
the less stony paths towards peace.
The Bush government pushed Israel towards a comprehensive peace but the 
Clinton administration was not as subsistent in urging Israel for peace. The agenda 
for talks was prepared by the US in accordance with the other parties but the neutral 
policies towards Israel had come to an end. As in the Syrian case the role of allies 
facilitated the move towards negotiations.
The Bush administration had put the relations between the two states on freeze 
and may be for the first time in years Israel’s insecurity towards its foster brother 
grew. The Clinton administration on the other hand, tried to replenish what had been 
lost.
The role of allies especially that of the US, after the Clinton takeover enriched 
with Labor victory with Rabin eased the tension between the two states. The US 
proposal of peace was not rejected nor viewed as conspiracy against the Israelis. This 
in turn facilitated the move towards negotiations.
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3.2.1.2 ROLE OF INTERMEDIARY
SYRIA
The preferred intermediary for Syria during the Cold War was undoubtedly the 
Soviet Union. More precisely dxrring the Cold War due to Soviet backing, Assad did 
not think about making peace with Israel.
After the Cold War, US being the only power left to dominate the international 
arena, was the most appealing candidate for settling disputes; through negotiations, 
and enforcing the peace once the agreement was reached. President Bush’s 
appointment of James Baker to the settlement of disputes and convening an 
international conference proved that the US was also interested in taking part, if not to 
sponsor the peace attempts. Peace was to be rewarded; by territory, by financial gains 
and by political endorsement from the US.
Assad, due to the systemic change, regional turbulances and domestic instabilities 
could not invest on coercion anymore^^. His first concern was, would the already 
stratified Syrian public digest the new foreign policy objectives. His second concern 
centered around whether he would be able comer Israel and get the best possible deal 
without losing face or giving unacceptable ( to the Syrians) concessions.
The second Gulf War was the chance that Assad was hoping to get, the collapsed 
Soviet Union would be of no help and years of isolationist policy had weakend the 
ties between its Arab brothers. Israel was still a threat and with the Golan invaded in 
1967 and annexed in 1981, strategically any move towards Syria would ensure fall of 
Damascus but making peace would fasten the first tier of security. Peace with US 
would place the Israelis on the comer. Indirectly, relations with Israel would ease and
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this alone would be an investment towards a pre-emptive attack from the other side. 
The US would due its best to stop confrontations, furthermore economic and political 
compensations would be the reward for being mild.
The intermediary factor facilitated the policy towards negotiations. In order to 
secure a place in the “New World Order”, Assad wanted to achieve peace -with 
minumum loss.
ISRAEL
Rabin’s takeover in spring 1992 signalled winds of change towards peace. The 
uncompromising attitude of the Likud government would tilt towards the Labor 
“land for peace” proposition.
The Likud led coalition government had strained its ties with the US. There was 
no consensus on avoiding the US but Likud government toppled with neutral Bush 
administration resulted in an impasse.
Luckily for Rabin few months after his election, Clinton became the newly 
elected president. He streesed that the US desired peace and stability in the region but 
not at the cost of neglecting the security needs of Israel.
A tilt towards a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace would need a gurantor to start 
the discussions and later monitor the implemention of the agreement’s ( if it is 
reached) mandatory procedures. The U.S would fit perfectly to this role. With the 
support of the Clinton administration Rabin predicted that he would not be cajoled 
into an environment where only Israeli concessions would shape the outcome. The 
US could compensate Israel in terms of intelligence, economic aid and as before 
political support.
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Unlike Assad’s case, Rabin was not forced into moving towards an agreement. 
He had not lost any allies, Israel did not experience the regional instabilities due to the 
collapse of the Soviet Union and the grants kept on rolling because although the Bush 
administaration had slowed down the pace of the economic aid, it did not halt it 
completely.
Rabin knew that he needed his population to have a state and a coercive Israel 
would mean more losses both in lives and in investment. Peace feelers had cautioned 
him of Assad’s changing foreign policy and his turn towards Washington. Rabin 
knew he had to act fast and at once.
The effect of US being the most desirable intermediary increased the chances of 
the two conflicting parties to come together. The intermediary and its vast resources 
made peace more appealing, especially to Syria. This variable was a facilitator 
towards negotiation in the sense that the communication channels between the two 
parties were open and both were willing to cooperate in order not to disinherit the 
intermediary to the other party.
3.2.1.3 SYSTEMIC CHANGE
The systemic change that came in effect was the repercussions of the Soviet 
Union’s collapse. This was a major event which ended the bi-polar balances and 
welcomed multi-polarity into the international arena. In the Middle East, Soviet 
supporters lost their most valuable ally and their future remained bleak. Due to social 
tensions and questioning of ideologies ushered in extreme nationalism and Islamic 
fundamentalism^^. The fall of Saddam after the second Gulf War signalled a new era 
of regional alliances since Saddam was the victor of the first Gulf War and had been 
defeated only by Allied forces and cooperating with the interest preserver US.
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Regional alliances could continue, but to question US presence in the region brought 
with it unbearable consequences.
Syria benefitted greatly from the systemic changes. By changing sides, it prized 
the US as a friend, mild strategies toward the Arab-Israeli dispute dettered any attack 
coming from Israel, afterall Rabin would not take the risk of attacking a cooperative 
Arab state. The milder strategies of Assad was an amalgam of issuing carrots and 
sticks. He would permit Syrian Jews to travel to Israel and give hand over, locating a 
captured Israeli pilot. At the same time, he would threaten to use sticks by tightening 
an Arab boycott of Israeli goods and unleashing Hezbollah and Palestinian groups .
Supporting the Allied powers during the second Gulf War was a carefully 
planned move by Assad with this move he would ensure his break from the Arab 
Nationalism movement and present Syria as a state which condemned coercion 
against vulnerable states such as Kuwait.
The only backfall would be upsetting Arab brothers and giving the premise for 
fundamentalist movements fostered by those states. Assad’s iron clench domestic 
policies and Ba’ath party’s suppressing acts would keep such movements bottled for a 
time.
Therefore the systemic change was a facilitator towards negotiations. It can not be 
predicted whether or not Assad had peace in mind when he chose the US as an ally. 
Assad predicted that, he would not need to go any further then givinig support to the 
Allies, but having the US support had a price and that price was to relax the tension 
between Syria and Israel instead of condemning the state of Israel and threatening to 
wipe it out of the Middle-East.
ISRAEL
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The end of the Cold War promised a more secure future since the states that 
received Soviet help would be cut short. Less help would denote less military 
investments. It was perceived as the Arab-Israeli conflict would continue but the 
Arabs would have to find a different sponsor.
The second Gulf War reminded the states in the Middle-East an old tradition. 
Whenever the power vacuum in the region was left unattended some state or some 
leader would make the most radical return. Saddam threatened the region and even 
the international arena, despite all US attempts. Once again Israel was at the threshold 
of being invaded or attacked vehemently.
These two events may not have facilitated the move towards negotiations if the 
Labor government had not won the elections. The Israelis saw peace as the best 
outcome. Their view depended on exchanging land for peace. There were also 
residual beliefs from the Shamir government which viewed depending on the US as 
treachery and giving up land, especially the Biblical lands, as sin.
The systemic change in itself is not either a facilitator nor a hinderance. It is an 
indicator that peace may be more profitable in the region since there are too many to 
handle and an ally accross the ocean can not always pre-empt missile attacks.
3.2.2 THE DOMESTIC CIRCUMSTANCE
The domestic circumstance in both states was not ripe for a peace settlement in 
1992. Rabin’s arch opposition came from his “kitchen cabinef’. Peres rejected 
drastic changes in policy. Peace could be discussed with every leader except Assad. 
His word could not be taken as a deed.
Assad had the similar problem but his methods of resolving opposition were 
much more effective. He chose to silence the ones who opposed him, whether they
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were his advisors or his people. He would have to convince the Israelis just like 
Sadat, that he could be trusted^*. At the same time he would have to convince his 
70% majority of a peace treaty with Israel would be to the advantage of S3nria.
In this category the effect of intra-party dispute, role of the public opinion and 
non-governmental organizations take place. Israel experiences these factors more 
severely since pohcies of oppression axe not hand.
3.2.2.1 THE EFFECT OF INTRA-PARTY DISPUTE
SYRIA
The Intra-party dispute in Syria, even if it was experienced, would never reach the 
top decision maker. If there was opposition, it would be oppressed by all means. 
Assad’s council formed of loyal friends and family members offered advice but it 
was only recommendatory.
Assad did not have a party to dispute him. He had a concentric circle of power 
points in which he was the radius. He had very close and loyal family members 
around him. Circling them were loyal members of military, some advisers and 
coimcils which directly reported to Assad^^. This larger circle was enveloped by 
formal institutions of army, party and state. The system was also coated by a 
constitution, legislative assembly and a coalition with other “progressive “ parties . 
Decisions made by Assad and the inner core were transmitted through the informal 
network for execution by organs of the army,state or party . The make up of the 
state pertained that of to a democratic one but pragmatically they were institutions 
which were impotent against Assad’s unlimited power.
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There was also an establishment of People’s Assembly, in which there were 
disproportionate representations of the public and the National Front which provided 
opposition. Again everything appeared to be legitimate after all who would inspect 
the state whether or not the concerned institutions were functioning properly and 
prepare a report claiming that the system was not like what it seemed.
The seeds of Alawite takeover was planted by Assad. He mollified the urban 
Suimi population not because of attempting to disguise his regime but by creating a 
new era of so called openness. He would moderate the social and economic policies 
of the Ba’ath. He hoped that economic well-being would transform his dissatisfied 
Sunni population to manageability. Assad also performed charades of revision and 
change in his policies. The strategy was reminiscent of the 1970’s takeover: some 
political and and economic liberalization, a series of measures offering greater 
participation and representation, without actually affecting the regime’s core, structure 
and degree of control^ .^
Everything in Syria appeared to be under control but the desire for peace did not 
go through the proper channels of legislation or to that extent, it was not the genius of 
the Ba’ath policies nor the military pressure.
The intra-party dispute was not something that was present in Syria. The major 
party did not have a rule over Assad and the other stage-set parties were there to 
complete a Western oriented state picture. The Ba’ath even if it had criticisms of 
Assad could not hold out for long.
The intra-party dispute had no effect on the eventual outcome of the negotiations. 
Assad could over-rule any decision he chose to and the only party, the only legislation
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organ and to an extent the not so public opinion was Assad and his inner circle of 
advisers.
ISRAEL
In contrast to the Syrian political environment the Israelis enjoyed a more flexible 
state system. There were a number of parties ranging fi:om the left, center left, center 
right, right and religous or far right parties. The members of the Knesset were elected 
by the public and their distribution depended on the votes that they received. The 
Israeli votes usually configured around two major parties the Likud and Labor. In 
1992 after a decade of Likud domination Labor party won the elections. This gave 
signs of change from one dominant party system into the two-block system . Likud 
represented the right end of the political spectrum with nationalistic and at times, 
religious tendencies. Whereas Labor was more to the left and it was further away 
from ultra religious currents. There was a change of power shifting from right to the 
left what declined to change was the participation of the religious parties in the 
coalition government. Power sharing between the religious and secular parties would 
remain unchanged '^*.
Most Likud members believed in Israel retaining the occupied territories whereas 
Labor members were more flexible in at least negotiating over some rather than 
keeping all. Likud stands for maintaining the status quo in the occupied territories, 
asserting its strategic importance to the survival of Israel and historical linkages could 
not be denied. They appear to oppose concessions believing that concessions will 
encourage further Arab demands^^. Whereas Labor placed Palestinian/ national 
security issues at its central platform, overarching domestic issues of social and
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economic policies^^. It proposed voluntary concessions which planned to withdraw 
from the West Bank.
As encountered in every political party, there was no consensus on exactly how 
much land could be negotiated for peace without deflecting its security; Apart from 
the consensus issue the main anxiety within the party was between Rabin and Peres.
The greatest obstacle that Rabin had to overcome was with Peres. Rabin was 
security minded but a centrist, he was not the leftist that Peres was. Rabin lacked 
support from his party, most of the time he was blamed for “being too soft on the 
adversaries” . He derived his power from the public. Rabin did not mention 
territorial compromise. He stressed self-rule for the Palestinians without yielding the 
West Bank. He did not favor a bi-national Israel . Security of the disputed lands had 
to be provided by the Israeli security forces.
Rabin announced that he did not view Palestinian terror as a threat to the country 
but a personal issue which could be enhanced by striking a deal instead of combat . 
Rabin’s aides and advisers especially Saguy , Shahak and Barak stressed the 
importance of Syria^\ They insisted that instead of dealing with the Palestinian 
dispute, Syrian track could be handled first and then resolve the callus. Rabin on the 
other hand ingeniously decided to use one track against the other to attain favorable 
outcomes. Whenever one track reached an impasse (i.e Palestinian) he would 
concentrate on the other ( i.e Syrian). Therefore he would be the master manipulator 
and he would try to put pressure on the parties by changing tracks. He knew that none 
of the parties could afford to be left behind.
Israeli decision making apparatus intensified around Rabin. He was the prime 
minister and the defence minister at the same time. Since he also held the defence
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minister position he had more authority in the history of Israel then any other prime 
minister^^. Every portfoho or every issue in any department went directly to Rabin. 
Foreign Relations and its objectives concentrated on two issues. The first issue was 
to deal with the Arab-Israeli conflict at all dimensions and tracks. The second issue 
was maintaining and cultivating US-Israeli relations. Since none of the Arab states, 
except Egypt, had recognized Israel, it did not have embassies and consulates to 
transmit information from the Arab world. For that reason military surpassed foreign 
relations since the military concerned itself with the mandates of Ministry of Foreign
n n
Affairs . In the decisions that were made, the cabinet was not as effective as Rabin 
himself.
The Intra-party dispute that took place within Labor was a hinderance towards 
negotiations. Rabin was not poprrlar in his party, his ideas could be opposed easily, 
and he knew that without the support from his party, he would not have the credibility 
to influence the Israeli public opinion.
3.2.2.2 THE ROLE OF PUBLIC OPINION
The public opinion in Syria and Israel differed. In general no one seemed to 
continue to fight but the way in which they could express their views produced a 
paradox. A contradiction to Assad could result in detention or imprisionment 
whereas the Israelis could protest and express their discontent.
The grand design of Assad was to get the Golan Heights back and to be 
cooperative vras one of the more credible means of getting it back. There was no 
threat in c»iiviueiug his 70% minority..
Rahia «  other hand faced the dilemma of convincing Likud and ultra 
religious amggmias e f  peace at the cost of what. No one wanted to be a victim of a
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terrorist attack and no one wanted to be abhored by aggressive neighbors. Israel’s 
security could not be neglected.
SYRIA
The Syrians had their way of expressing their unapproval. They may not have 
been as loud as the Israelis but it was pronoxmced nonetheless. When Assad drifted 
his policy from following the Soviet Union to cooperating with the US, the criticisms 
were voiced in several forms-grafitti, leaflets and conversations with foreign 
correspondents^"*. The same event repeated when Saddam was portrayed as a vicious 
aggressor. Many Syrians listened to Baghdad’s radio station, they expressed 
sympathy for Saddam and displeasure with their own governments conduct .
The 70% suimi population may appear to be in disharmony with Assad’s policies 
but this may not be the issue. After the Alawite takeover in 1970 the Muslim 
Brotherhod tried to gain supporters from the Sunni population. The Sunnis were 
secular in nature therefore rejected calls to unifying for Arab solidarity and in reality, 
for Islamic fundamentalism under cover .
The Ba’ath party had the goal of forming a united Arab socialist society. Its 
ideology emphasized pan-Arabism and socialism and its motto was “unity, freedom 
and socialism”. The Arab people in order to achieve this objective must “struggle 
against colonialism, Zionism and provincial and seperatist trends” and be involved in
n n
a “revolution against domination and exploitation . The party also tried to improve 
the quality of life in the countryside which was populated by the Sunnis. In a way this 
was a safety valve against a Sunni outburst. They would be kept satisfied first, if
confrontations occured, then they would be oppressed38
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The Sunni’s had no reason to contradict the party or Assad as long as they were 
kept happy. Furthermore Assad’s superior intelligence service, would detect any acts 
of unifying against the government abort it before it gave birth to trouble. The public 
opion was in harmony with the government so this entity did not put pressure on the 
leader nor its policies at the same time it was not a force that blocked the flexibility of 
the leader to take initiations.
ISRAEL
In 1976 the CIA reported that:
“There is no willingness of the Israeli public to go along with a formal Arab-Israeli 
peace which entailed the return of most territories captured in 1967. The Israelis 
insisted the territories should be retained. East Jerusalem, some parts of West Bank, 
the Golan Heights and Sharm el-Sheikh could not be negotiated. The public also 
backs military and civilian leaders’ insistence on holding positions which would 
discourage or impede any conventional or guerrilla Arab attack” .
During the 1980’s Israel strived for a political settlement according to its terms, 
meaning cooperation was not the first choice. Up until 1992, Israel preserved its 
status quo policy regarding the Golan. There was a certain relaxing of relations from; 
we shall never surrender the Golan Heights to, talks can be held but no miracle should 
be expected" °^.
Israeli society as of today is not fully formed. The weight of the immigrant 
population is still felt. The passing of nearly two generations since the founding of 
the state and succession of important events have created a new consciousness that is 
expressed for the negotiations'* \  The generational change in Israel is a key influence 
in the support for the negotiations. This new generation had first shown political 
independence in the 1992 elections. Most removed their support from the Likud and 
some returned to Labor or scattered into the Sephardi Orthodox party. The new
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generation was aware of issues and problems and therefore saw the captured lands as 
a liability rather than an asset"^ .^ The continuation of conflict translated to an 
inordinately high price without guaranteeing any assurance of a payoff
The Israeli public rallied for the Declaration of Principles. Although the initial 
agreement aroused excitement the public support remained highly unstable. At the 
first aimoxmcement of an upcoming peace agreement the public support was about 
45%, by the time of the signing in Washington rising to 65%, two months later it 
declined to 39% with a large imdecided vote and an unfortunate increase in those 
opposed to 45%^ ^^ . Public support which is neccesary for full implementation of 
agreements depends on the leadership of both sides in providing satisfaction for their 
publics and security.
Agreements can be signed but if they are not implemented, then the public will 
feel insecure and the agreement will not be binding to them since their lives would be 
at risk on the street not Rabin’s (ironically even his). It appears as though the road to 
peace started off on a positive note but due to its non-implementation it soured and 
declined.
Public Opinion helped Rabin plant the seeds of peace. If the public had not 
turned more flexible then, Rabin may not have ended the Likud saga. This in itself 
was an indicator that the Shamir government’s tough stance towards peace and 
clashing with the US was not favored. Public opinion facilitated the way towards 
negotiation.
3.2.2.3 ROLE OF NON-GOVERUMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS
As witnessesd in the first case there are no signs of NGO’s taking place during 
the conflict. There may have been some in Israel since its social structure and power
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distribution was more flexible than that of Syria. In Syria, there is a very low 
probability of such a formation. Again if they were present they did not play an active 
role, therefore did not have an affect on the outcome.
3.2.3 THE LEADER
The leader in both of the societies contributed to the decision making apparatus to 
the greatest extent. In Syria Assad was the sole power and in Israel, Rabin with his 
role as the prime-minister and the defence minister had most of the power encircling 
him moré than any other leader in Israeli history.
The leader category consists of threat of looming disaster, leader change/leadership 
style, costs outweighing benefits and change in priority variables. It is needless to say 
that the systemic change and the regional reconfirgurations elbowed the leaders 
toward the table but what was astonishing was the unique way that each chose to 
pursue.
3.2.3.1 THREAT OF LOOMING DISASTER 
SYRIA
There is no implication that Assad chose to cooperate, due to a threat of looming 
disaster. Therefore this variable is not applicable for Syria.
ISRAEL
There is no evidence that Rabin procrastinated a looming disaster. One can not be 
sure whether or not this variable was present. Therefore this variable is not applicable 
for Israel.
3.2.3.2 CHANGE IN LEADER / LEADERSHIP STYLE
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This category functions in two ways. If there is no change in leader as in the case 
of Syria then the leadership style will be dominant. Whereas in the Israeli case both 
of the variables are active. There is a leader change from Shamir to Rabin and his 
style is also an effective element towards negotiations.
SYRIA
Assad is a dichotomy of the Ba’ath and military. His beliefs grew out of his 
party backgroxmd and authority came from his military background. As he climbed 
the ladders towards power he tried to achieve the goals of the Ba’ath party while 
being head of the Syrian army.
Assad’s aim of Arab solidarity is a struggle against Syria’s zero-sum battle with 
forces of imperialism, Zionism and exploitation. Embeded in this view is the notion 
of “Greater Syria”^ . He became particularly interested in this idea after the Egyptian- 
Israeli disengagement. Since 1975 Syria has been involved in the Palestinian causes 
and making Syria indispensable in Lebanon. He joined with Jordan’s King Hussein, 
when Hussein was against Israel. Syria became belligerent when negotiations 
between Jordan and Israel began. Daniel Dishon suggests that Assad “wants to 
produce a situation in which Damascus is the place to which both Jordan and Lebanon 
as well as the PLO have to turn, in order to clear major decisions”"^ .^ In short any 
attempt to by-pass Syria from the peace negotiations would backfire. Any peace that 
is reached without Syria would be meaningless.
Assad also had a ’’devil image “ of Israel an inherent bad-faith image of the 
enemy. Israel could not due anything right, one must always be suspicious of the 
motives of its leadership"^ ®. Israel can not act on its own but its actions are 
programmed by some other state. He believes Syria and Israel have a basic conflict of
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interest-both want the same land and both believe that their countries have innate 
leadership rights over this territory.
Assad’s political style has the following qualities; behind the scenes maneuvering, 
broad consultation, control of information and attention to detail, use of incentives, 
pragmatism and patience" ’^.
With-up-to date information and a sense of who is interested in what, Assad 
knows where to apply the carrot and the stick. ”To his mind everything has a price, 
but it is up to hirh to fix it. He does not bother with limits and boundaries set by 
others'^ *. Assad also has patience and sense of political timing. He is said to have bult 
his power stone by stone, he never rushes'^ .^ He makes a move, then stops and assess 
the effect and considers the new situation and players before he makes his next move. 
His policy is coined as “decibel politics” by the US officials. He heightens tensions 
for a few days, then lowers it. This behavior gives him the flexibility to test the 
limits of his opponent.
Assad has built his regime around three institutions: the Ba’ath party, the military 
and the governmental bureaucracy. He heads all three of these institutions. His 
power and authority is a unitary patron-client structure with him as the chief patron^°. 
He carefully examines the leadership positions in these institutions. Assad restricts 
the roles of these individuals and shuffles his cabinet periodically. It is a paranoid 
world, Assad appears to have the most loyal around him and yet he even doubts them.
The Syrian leader uses two techniques to deal with opposition in the society; 
deflection and repression. Israel, Iraq, Moslem Brotherhood and United States are 
scapegoats on which he deflects internal problems claiming that they are the enemy 
and responsible for Syria’s troubles^^ If he is unable to overcome the opposition in
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the society, then he will resort to repressive tactics. The uprising can be crushed 
ruthlessly as witnessed in the 1970’s.
When Assad decided to change sides during the second Gulf War he knew that 
the Arab-Israeli conflict would take a different turn and that Syria would be involved 
and taken into consideration at last. It was not that conflict worried bim but any 
means of getting the Golan would be justifiable. After the war Assad’s minurmim 
goal was to keep the peace process going and avoid being blamed for any breakdown; 
he wanted to see if an acceptable agreement could be reached while avoiding one that 
appeared to settle for much less than full Israeli withdrawal^^. He would appear with 
the US be cooperative and wait for its consequences. Israel would have the next move.
With the Bush administration in charge, the Syrians would not have much to 
worry. The US poHcy makers noted that peace needed sacrifices from both sides not 
just from Syrians alone. The support from the US and their pressure on Israel, would 
place the adversary in such a position, that they would have to accept peace on Syrian 
terms.
Assad’s main challenge was to deter Israel and the US from any temptation to 
leave. Syria out of the peace process, without appearing to act as a spoiler^ .^ He still 
had his cards to play if things did not go as he had planned, he could always stir up 
the rejectionist Palestinians and revive the Hizballah in Lebanon if Syrian interests 
were ignored.
The Syrian leader once said that “Syria is the core of the problem and the key to 
the Middle East solution” "^^. So that Assad and Syria will not be left out of any 
negotiated settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict, he will either play the role of a
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spoiler or a leader of peace processs depending whether or not Syria is included in the 
process.
Henry Kissinger is reported to have said about the Middle East that “No war is 
possible without Egypt and no peace is possible without Syria”^^ . Assad is aware of 
the fact that he is needed in the peace process and he is trying to come out of it with 
the best deal.
The fairy tale state strucure of Syria adds up to one conclusion , it is the leader 
who is at the apex of both the decision making apparatus and power. If the decision 
to go on with the peace negotiations had not been accepted by Assad it may have 
never come to life.
The leader was a definite facilitator towards negotiations.
ISRAEL
Rabin came to power through democratic means. This was the second time that 
he had taken office in the government. The first time was over-shadowed by 
propositions of improriety which left his wife Lea under suspicion but his public 
trusted him and therefore elected Labor over Likud ending a long time domination.
The main difference between the previous government and the Labor government 
was the definition of peace. The former defined it as “peace for peace” the latter as 
“land for peace”. The peace for peace proposal asked for full diplomatic, economic, 
cultural relations with Syria without withdrawing from the Golan. Rabin argued that 
peace needed compromise on both sides. He concluded in saying that he believed that 
UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 did apply on the Golan and stated that 
Israel could TOEhdraw on (if not from)the Golan in return for a peace accord.
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In spring 1992 Syria announced as a goodwill gesture that the remaining Jews in 
Syria would be free to travel, but later in the year the government slowed down the 
process. Assad announced that he was willing to take the initiative for the peace of 
the brave which would hasten both Jordan and PLO thinking that Syria would reach 
an agreement and get the best deal.
Rabin at this point would first seperate the conflict into tracks and try to strike a 
deal with each one. He would start off with the PLO, if that track reached an impasse, 
he would immediately switch to the other track. This would create competition for 
the two tracks and they would be more willing to cooperate Before making his last 
move at Oslo, Rabin pointed that the lack of movement from the Syrian side eased his 
way towards the PLO in Oslo. He had started concentrating on the S5nian track but 
their vmacceptable pre-condition of withdrawal from the Golan first and then 
agreement made him say “When I decided to go all the way (with the Palestinians, it 
was because the Syrians) still demanded total withdrawal (from the Golan Heights), 
uprooting of the Israeli settlements ( there), and were not even ready for full-fledged 
peace . Peres also confirms that a major factor in Rabin’s decision to deal with the 
PLO was the realization after Christopher’s trip in August, that there was no “Syrian 
Option”.
Rabin felt that international and regional changes offered Israel a short term 
’’window of opportunity” to resolve the core conflict with Israel’s Arab neighbors. He 
sensed that if a full scale confrontation took place, then Israel could be strategically 
impaired. An already insurgent Iran and a rapidly recovering Iraq worried him
Also on Rabin’s mind was the threat of Hamas. One can not overestimate the 
importence o f the rise of Hamas in persuading Israel and Rabin in particular to
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pursue the opportunity that Oslo presented .^ .^ Despite the setbacks, Israel would 
pursue the peace process as if there was no terrorism and fight terrorism as if there 
was no peace.
Rabin was the only leader in the Israeli politics who was capable of seizing the 
opportunity to make peace at Oslo. The Likud leader Netanyahu had the credibility 
but not the will to make territorial concessions and recognize the PLO, Peres had the 
will but lacked the credibility. If it was not Rabin the peace process may not have 
been successful® .^
In Israel, the decision making apparatus was highly personalized. It did not have 
an institution like the National Security Coimcil nor a powerfol inner cabinet. The 
prime ministers usually had two items on their agenda of foreign affairs: the Arab- 
Israeli conflict and the US Israeli relations. The Israeli government is usually made 
up of coalitions so the fractions also create impediments for a consensus on policy. 
The Israeli Defense Force plays an important role in shaping national security issues, 
the interagency system is relatively weak in Israel. Every institution such as the army 
works on its own and in its field rather than a collaborative project.
As the Oslo process and the Israeli-Jordan agreement shifted to implementation, 
the last aim of Rabin was to revive the Syrian track. The formal negotiations which 
began m Madrid (1991) were suspended in February 1994 after the Hebron massacre. 
In the summer of 1994, fruitful talks began between the ambassadors to Washington 
and US officials in the same room. They remained seperated on four issues: the 
extent of Israel’s withdrawal from Golan, the degree of peace and normalization (i.e 
diplomatic relations, trade, tourism etc.) that Syria will offer in return, the timetable 
and the security arrangements that will be neeeded to maintain the peace. It depended
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on Assad to provide a precise definition of peace and whether this definition was 
compatible with that of Israel. In Rabin’s words the ’’depth of withdrawal is parallel 
to the depth of peace
Rabin tried to reach a common point until his assasination in November 1995. US 
officials offered sending the region a contingent force and Rabin agreed to this by 
suggesting that the land forces concentrating on the Golan could be reduced if there 
were plans of de-militarizmg the region. Assad made attempts of cooperating but 
when he felt that he was not getting what he deserved, he would push back the process 
for couple of months.
Rabin was a facilitator towards negotiations. He was criticized by Netanyahu for 
being too soft on the Arabs and the terrorists. Ironically like Sadat what he had 
started could not be finished because of some radical young man who did not share 
his passion for peace.
3.2.3.3 COSTS OUTWEIGHING BENEFITS
When costs, whether economic, political or social, start to overshadow the 
benefits, the leaders review their coercive methods and usually decide to cooperate. 
It is assumed that once costs start outweighing the benefits, this usually results in 
leaders moving towards negotiations.
SYRIA
Assad due to the systemic change, had to revise his coercive tactics. He still 
wanted the Golan back and the Greater Syria idea lingered on. What changed was the 
meaos o f attaining it. After the Gulf War, Bush administration decided it was the 
right thaae to launch a peace initiative which would bring the parties of the conflict 
together wdE*· the auspices of the United States. This was the first time that all of the
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concerned parties faced each other in 1991 in Madrid. Bush and Christopher urged 
the parties to concentrate on the commonalities rather than the differences. The 
conflicts were divided into tracks and each track met with its concerned parties. The 
Syrian track collapsed with the statement “law of international rule must be obeyed 
not the law of the jungle”. Syrians claimed that tire conference was not in harmony
.62with international law
The Syrain leader noticed the fact that he must cooperate to achieve his goal but 
this did not prevent him from creating obstacles so that minute details delayed the 
process while Assad calculated his next move according to the Israeli reaction. Peace 
would be beneficial because with the Soviet fountain all dried up, the banker and the 
gunrdealer left Syria all by itself. Too much investment on arms had already widened 
the disparity between economic and social development . Since the investment was 
not bringing any profit, the policies had to be revised. This would translate to, Assad 
investing in social welfare rather than arms which would keep the dissident Sunnis 
satisfied, therefore peace woiild have an appealing package and no one would think of 
opposing, since money would be rolling. Charles King suggests that as potential 
benefits begin to decline due to rising costs, usually this produces rise to dissidents 
both in the society and in the political party that is in power^ "^ .
An isolated Syria would not be of use to anyone. Politically, with the Soviets 
dealing with their domestic problems, the Syrians had to find new firiends in the 
international arena and no one would support a coercive and uncompromising 
country. Plus he always had the Hizballah card to play. If things did not go as 
planned or further negotiation was not desired, the indirect intervention of the
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Hizballah may change the course of events. Syria had nothing to lose but could gain, 
if Assad was patient enough.
Syria wanted to be part of the “New Order” and this order dictated compromise. It 
is not surprising to see that Assad interpreted peace diffferently than Rabin. It was his 
peace and his rules compromise was not sought.
Despite the reasons why Assad may have resorted to peace, due to the changes 
taking place in the international arena costs of coercion would very high. It might 
have resulted in economic fluctuation due to continued investment in arms. It might 
have resulted in social instability with rising costs and less investment in social 
welfare and finally it may put Syria back to isolation in a “New World Order” . New 
World to the sense that the US dominated the arena.
Costs outweighing benefits was a facilitator towards negotiations. It involved 
Assad calculating costs in return for Golan if the agressiveness continued. Only 
peace would be beneficial.
ISRAEL
The 1967 Six Day War was a turning point in the Israeli-Palestiruan conflict. 
Under the command of then the Chief of Staff, General Yitzhak Rabin, the Israel 
Defense Force captured the Golan Heights, Sinai Peninsula, West Bank (includitig 
East Jerusalem) and Gaza Strip. Although the war provided Israel with greater 
strategic depth and more defensible borders, it also made Israel responsible for the 
security and well-beuig of the more than 1 million Palestinian inhabitants of the 
occupied territories and created another 200,000 refngees^^.
During the election rallies Rabin did not mention swapping land for peace, 
eventhough the Labor platform called for compromise, Rabin did his best to avoid
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turning Israel into a bi-national state. He also pledged that Israel “would not come 
down from the Golan”. He believed that Palestinian terror did not constitute a threat 
to Israel but rather it was an issue of personal security, combating them was not the 
solution but striking a deal might be. This controversial policy was debated in the 
Labor party.
After the elections, Rabin decided that Israel had to seperate itself from die 
Palestinians if it wanted to be safe, he said, autonomy would mean fewer Gazan 
workers in Israel and thus fewer attacks on the Israelis^®. Gaza and West Bank were 
poor areas and had the potential of housing fundamentalist tendencies which would 
directly threaten the Israeli government.
Three advisers of Rabin namely: Barak, Shahak and Saguy were known to favor 
progress on the Syrian track. This was neccessary in order to alter the region’s 
strategic equation. Saguy insisted on the Syria first setttlement, and he stated as early 
as 1990 that ’’Israel had to make peace with Damascus”®^. In September 1992 he told 
reporters that there was a yearning for peace among the Syrian people^^. The 
intelligence reports confirmed that Damascus was serious about negotiating with 
Israel..
Rabin started his peace attempts by focusing at bi-lateral rather than multiple and 
simultaneous tracks. He could easily play one track against the other^ .^ Plus the 
Israeli public would find one agreement to be more digestible.
The costs were high in the sense that Israel was surrounded by Arab neighbors 
and the Camp David Agreement had not produced the effect that was planned by the 
Israeh officials at the time of the signing. Barak suggested that having a dialogue 
with the PLO would put a hold on terrorism since it was constantly infiltrating from
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Libya and Iran . One could not fight all. Due to economic burdens the occupied 
lands were becoming hmchbacks to Israel’s growth. The Golan Heights had water 
resources, so there might be further trouble in letting it go. For the time being, the 
Israelis would concentrate on the negotiations, switch tracks if neccessary but would 
not shut down the chaimels of communication due to Sjnian pre-conditions of total 
withdrawal.
Costs did outweigh the benefits therefore it was a facilitator towards negotiations.
3.2.3.4 CHANGE IN PRIORITY
Change in priority is an unavoidable result of costs outweighing benefits. As 
things start to decline, policy modifications had to be made. It is usually asumed that 
change in priorities is a facilitator towards negotiation.
SYRIA
Syria’s change in priority came as a result of systemic changes and regional 
alterations in alliance structures. If one views the situation more closely, it can be 
inferred that the desire for Golan Heights had not subsided only this time the credible 
way of attaining it was through peaceful means. Concessions were not thought of, 
aflerall Israel invaded the occupied territories and they were to return which was not 
theirs. Syria had nothing to give up. It was the victim of Israeli agression and 
according to international law agressors were to be punished.
All Assad had to do was go along with the peace process and change the image of 
Syria the terrorist state, to Syria the integral part of the peace process. The Hizballah 
activities had to be curbed for a while. It could always be used as wild card in times 
of trouble. Syria would insure itself at no cost.
Change in priority was a facilitator towards negotiations.
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ISRAEL
Rabin changed the priority of combating all the Arab states to making peace one 
by one. Reviving the Camp David spirit was discussed. First he made a choice of 
choosing between the Syrian and the PLO track. Due to Assad’s intransigence the 
PLO was favored over Syria. He was smart enough to use the Syrian track whenever 
there was an impasse at the PLO negotiations. The pressured PLO would fear to be 
left out of the process and it would try to attract Israel’s attention again, by breaking 
the impasse . None of the parties wanted to be left behind apart from wanting, they 
could not afford to be left behind. Syria had the same hunch, no one could prevent 
Syria from the benefits of a peace treaty. When Israeli-Jordanian treaty was signed, 
Assad condemned the whole thing. The Declaration of principles and the Oslo 
Accords were just as disturbing. Assad was falling behind every concerned party was 
getting some compensation for contributing to peace, but Syria was beind ignored.
Syria desired a Camp David like Agreement, which translated into, full 
withdrawal. Rabin argued that, in order to reach a similar agreement, parties had to 
trust each other. Sadat had to come to Jerusalem and make a speech at the Emesset, 
trying to convey the message that, Egypt was serious about negotiating. Assad would 
have to convince the Israelis that he could be trusted’ .^ Egypt in return for the Sinai, 
had initiated diplomatic relations with Israel pledging recognition and commitment to 
normalization of relations. Assad without taking these factors into consideration 
pressed for a Camp David.
Hamas was a factor which also contributed to peace efforts. Both the Israelis and 
the Palestinians needed their population in order to have a state. Terrorist attacks
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produced loss on both sides and at this point both the PLO and the Isrealis wanted to 
attain peace.
Any third party intervention needed to have clear cut benefits for Israel. Military 
aid, arms for peace (deterrent capability) and satellite launchers would be suggested to 
the US, aflerall Rabin did not want to come out of the deal empty handed . Gulf 
Coopearation Coimcil could provide low-level recognition in the form of opening a 
liason office and the economic boycott may be lifted.
The resources will be shifted from settlements into improved infrastructure which 
would total up to 1 million dollars annually. It was already evident that the occupied 
territories were backdrafting the growth of Israel. As the social imrest climbed, any 
hopes of reaching an agreement would be lost forever. For that reason in order to 
keep the Israelis happy cooperation had to be reached.
Change in priority was a facilitator toward peace. It created other options like a 
prosperous fiscal year, increase in aid from the US government and a quasi-safe 
region.
3.3 CONCLUSION
In this section the results of analytical investigation of the Syrian- Israeli conflict 
will be given. A summary of the effect of the variables on the Post Cold War period 
of the Syrian-Israeli conflict is given in Table 4.
SYRIA
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According to Table 4, for Syria, the most facilitating category was the leader. 
Looming disaster variable was not present. The remaining variables of change in 
leader/ leadership style, costs outweighing benefits and change in priority contributed 
positively towards negotiation. Assad and his policy making towards the Israelis was 
the pushing force towards negotiations.
The domestic circumstance category was almost not applicable for Syria. Out of 
the three variables; the effect of intra-party disputes, role of public opinion and the 
role of NGO’s, none had a facilitating nor a hindering effect. This result can be 
interpreted as Assad’s oppressive measures suffocating domestic constituencies and 
this may be reason why the previous category operated smoothly.
Finally, the international context perhaps due to the systemic change, was also a 
facilitating category towards negotiations. From the three variables of role of allies, 
role of intermediary and systemic change all had positive effects on the Syrian case. 
The systemic change and prerequisites of taking part in the “New World Order”, 
demanded cooperation therefore Syria yielded to the demands.
ISRAEL
According to Table 4, for Israel, the overarching facihtating category was the 
leader. The looming disaster variable was not applicaple. The remaining three 
variables; leader change/ leadership style, costs outweighing benefits and change in 
priority contributed positively towards negotiations. Rabin was the major driving 
force which pushed Israel for conflict termination.
The domestic circumstance category had three different results. Role of public 
opinion variable had a positive effect on the outcome. The effect of the intra-party 
dispute was negative and finally the role of public opinion was not applicable. Since
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the Israeli domestic constituncies were not oppressed the variations can be regarded as 
being essential for a democratic regime.
Finally, the international context category was also decisive in moving towards 
conflict termination. The systemic change category was neutral, since nothing much 
changed for Israel. The remaining two categories role of allies and role of 
intermediary were facilitating variables. The international context for Israel denoted 
to the US and its insistence for peace and stability in the Middle-East.
As an overview, the leader category was the most facilitating. The looming 
disaster category was not applicable to both states. The variables of leader change/ 
leadership style, costs outweighing benefits and change in priority were positive 
effects towards negotiation. Out of the four variables one was not applicable while 
the remaining three were positive.
The domestic circumstance category was highly ambivalent. As a total; there 
were four not applicables, one facilitating and one hindering effect. The results 
present that the domestic circumstance and its variables were almost impotent.
Finally the second most facilitating category was the international context. In 
total the results were five facilitating and one neutral.
The following chapter is a conclusion to the research. In this section the results 
from the Egyptian-Israeli and the Syrian-Israeli conflicts will be compared.
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TABLE 4: THE EFFECTS OF VARIABLES ON THE
SYRIAN-ISRAELI CONFLICT
INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT
ROLE OF ALLIES ROLE OF 
INTERMEDIARY
SYSTEMIC
CHANGE
SYRIA + +
ISRAEL + + 0
DOMESTIC CIRCUMSTANCE
EFFECT OF INTRA 
PARTY DIPUTE v
ROLEOFPUBUC
OPINION
ROLE OF NGO’S
SYRIA N/A N/A N/A
ISRAEL - + N/A
LEADER
; LOOMING 
DISASTER
LEADER
CHANGE/
STYLE.
COSTS
OUTWEIGING
BENEFITS
CHANGE IN 
PRIORITY
SYRIA N/A + + +
ISRAEL N/A + +
+ : Facilitating Effect Towards Conflict Termination
; Hindering Effect Towards Conflict Termination 
0 : Neutral
N/A : Not Applicable
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CHAPTER IV
CONCLUSION
The aim of this study was to investigate the factors which impregnate or halt the 
process of conflict termination. For this purpose, pre-negotiation phase of two cases, 
Pre- Camp David phase of the Egyptian-Israeli conflict and the Syrian-Israeli conflict 
in the Post Cold War period were examined.
In this section first, a summary account of the findings, and their relevance with 
the initial propositions are presented. Second, major conclusions concerning the 
results of the research are reported. A summary of the findings are shown in Table 
5.
INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT
ROLE OF ALLIES
As stated in Chapter I, it is usually assumed that allies, states that provide 
econormc, military and political support to the conflicting party, is a facilitator 
towards negotiations if they have political or economic interests in the conflict and 
cooperation is to their benefit.
EGYPT& ISRAEL
In the Egypt-Israeli case, for Egypt it was a hinderance since all of the Arab states 
and the Soviet Union viewed coercion as the ultimate mean in attaining the Sinai 
peninsula. For Israel since the US was the only ally their support for peace would
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have effects on the Israeli decision maJdng process therefore the role of allies was a 
facilitator towards negotiations.
SYRIA«& ISRAEL
In the Syria-Israel case, Assad made modifications in his allies. Cold War allies 
were neglected and the US was chosen as the new ally to take part in the “New World 
Order”. Therefore, US as a new ally facilitated the pre-negotiation process towards 
negotiations. The US support continued for Israel in the Syrian-Israeli conflict 
particularly after the Labor victory over Likud. Therefore, role of allies was a 
definite facilitator.
The results were in accordance with Proposition I, since the US was an ally to 
both of the conflicting parties and it desired peace in the region, it facilitated the 
process.
THE ROLE OF INTERMEDIARY
It is usually assumed that if the intermediary is a state with political and economic 
credibility it is predicted it will be the guiding force in pushing parties towards 
negotiation.
EGYPT & ISRAEL
The Egyptian-Israeli conflict had the US as the intermediary. Egypt views the 
intermediary as a facilitator towards negotiation. There may be political and even 
economic pressure from the Arab states but these can be compensated by the US. 
Israel also has the same plans plus it is desthied to go along with the US even if it has 
some reservations. It is also a facilitator for Israel.
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The Syrian - Israeli case also welcomed the US as the iatermediary. Assad 
viewed the situation as changing the makeup of foreign relations but attaining the 
same goals. The US could pressure Israel to give up the Golan. It was a facilitator for 
Syria. Rabin perceived the situation as any third party intervention should have clear- 
cut gains for Israel. The intermediary was a facilitator towards negotiations as long as 
Israel got its share.
The findings were in accordance with Proposition II. The iatermediary with its 
immense political and economic credibility facilitated the process towards conflict 
termination.
SYSTEMIC CHANGE
It is usually assumed that a systemic change, in this case from a bi-polar system 
to a multi-polar system, is a facilitator for the pre-negotiation process toward 
negotiations.
EGYPT & ISRAEL
In the Egyptian-Israeli case neither of the parties appear to be affected by the 
systemic change. There is no change but the bi-polar world has no effect in pushing 
the parties toward negotiation. The systemic change variable is not applicable in this 
case.
SYRIA& ISRAEL
In the Syrian -Israeli case both of the parties are effected by the systemic change. 
For Syria it is a facilitator towards negotiations because the era of coercion has come 
to an end, the absence of Soviet Union contributed to Assad’s change of policy
SYKIA& ISRAEL
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towards peace. Israel has not been effected since it still had the same ally but the 
same problem of non-recognition. This variable is neutral towards negotiations.
Proposition i n  could not be tested on the Egyptian-Israeli case since there was 
no systemic change. In the second case, the same proposition was supported for Syria 
and Israel. For Syria it is a facilitator whereas in the case of Israel, the impact of the 
variable is detected but since the US remained as an ally, the alliance structures did 
not change.
DOMESTIC CIRCUMSTANCE
EFFECT OF INTRA-PARTY DISPUTE
It is usually assumed that the intra-party dispute that is encountered within the 
domain of domestic circumstance can handicap the decision making apparatus from 
operating properly therefore it can be said to hinder the process toward negotiations. 
EGYPT& ISRAEL
In the Eg5^ tian-Israeli case, Sadat has great difficulty in convincing his advisers 
and his party that peace is beneficial to Egypt. Vice-president Mubarak never 
criticizes him openly but poses file greatest threat to his legitamacy. For Egypt it is a 
hinderance. Begin on the hand is not easily convinced therefore his attempts of 
convincing Likud are not genuine. Israel also experiences the intra-party variable as a 
hinderance.
SYRIA& ISRAEL
The Syrian-Israeli case is somewhat different because Assad’s iron-clench rule 
does not permit any entity to doubt him. Therefore even if Ba’ath contradicts him 
this will not be expressed severely, as long as Assad is convinced that peace is more 
appealing there wont be any institution that could stop him from attaining it. The
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intra-party variable has no effect in moving towards negotiations, it is not applicable. 
Israel experiences this variable to the highest extent. Rabin is not a popular man in 
his party and Peres, just like Sadat’s case, is not easily convinced. Labor goes 
through phases of foil support for Rabm to not supporting him, especially after 
terrorist attacks. Therefore the intra-party variable is a hiaderance toward 
negotiations.
The Egyptian-Israeli case is in accordance with Proposition TV. It can be 
contradicted that Sadat may have overcome his intra-party disputes with similar 
measures used hy Assad, but in any case, there were people who could contradict him 
they could not be pacified as easily as in Syria. The Syrian-Israeli case is partly in 
accordance with the same proposition, in the sense that Israel experiences it as a 
hinderance whereas Syria experiences it but it is hard to detect whether it is 
experienced and repressed or not experienced at all. In Syria Assad dominates the 
domestic arena. It would be naive to search for channels of discontent towards 
Assad’s policies.
ROLE OF PUBLIC OPINION
It is usually assumed that a public opinion that is pro peace will facilitate the 
process towards negotiations. If they contradict their leader it is ambigious whether 
their view will be taken into account. In the two cases even if the public completely 
contradicted the leader it is unlikely that the policies would change.
EGYPT& ISRAEL
In the Egyptian-Israeli case, Sadat’s decisions were not effected by his public, the 
climbing jirflafion gave rise to domestic instabilities which found shelter in Islamic 
fundamentalism that was crushed hy Sadat by his support for extreme nationalists.
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The public did not give full support to making peace with Israel since they were more 
concerned about finding food to eat. The public opinion variable was a hinderance. 
Israel also had the same problem, the public opinion was tom between peace, some 
believed in not surrendering to any Arab state whereas some thought that making 
peace with one could open the channels. Begin government could not press for peace, 
since their party mandates were restrictive towards making peace with the Arabs. 
Therefore this variable was neutral towards negotiations.
SYRIA& ISRAEL
The Syrian-Israeli case had a different dimension. Due to Assad’s repressive
policies the existence of the public opinion is in doubt. Even if it is present whether
) '
or not it had a will of its own is doubtable. The variable of public opinion was not 
applicable in the Syrian case. Rabin was the key to the public opinion. He was 
elected over Likud and his policies were milder than his predecessor. He might not 
'have had his party’s support but he had his public’s support. The variable of public 
opinion was a facilitator towards negotiations.
In both of the cases only Israel in the Syrian case was in accordance with 
Proposition V. Both of the Arab states due to their repressive policies did not depend 
on public opinion.
ROLE OF NGO’S
It is usually assumed that the role of NGO’s have a facilitating effect on the 
process towards negotiations. In the two conflicts that have been touched upon 
previously, this variable could not be detected in order to be analyzed. It is ambigious 
whether they were present but dormant or not present at all. Due to insufficient
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information Proposition VI could not be tested. The role of NGO’s variable is not 
applicable for the two cases.
LEADER
THREAT OF LOOMING DISASTER
It is usually assumed that a growing threat of a looming disaster will channel the 
leader towards conflict termination strategies. This variable was not applicable hi any 
of the conflicts. Therefore, Proposition VII could not be tested.
LEADER CHANGE/ LEADERSHIP STYLE
It is usually assumed that if a leader is entrapped in her coercive policies, then a 
change in leader will facilitate the process towards negotiations. If there is no leader 
change such as in the case of Assad, then the leadership style may be effective. If the 
leader is willing to cooperate then it is a definite facilitator towards negotiations. 
EGYPT& ISRAEL
In the Egyptian-Israeli case, Sadat’s takeover after Nasser’s death was a drastic 
change with Sadat’s obvious tendencies towards the West. Apart from the leader 
change the leadership style is also a facilitator towards negotiations. Sadat’s 
commitment to peace and his sincerety in convincing the Israeli public are all his style 
of attaining the Sinai through peaceful means. Begin on the other hand, had a lot lose 
if peace was to be discussed his religious Herat sect within Likud still held on the 
ideals of the early settlers, a Greater Israel had to be achieved. This ideal could not be 
achieved by promising the Sinai to the Egyptians, the others might follow. The leader 
change/ leadership style was a facilitator towards negotiations, despite Begin’s 
commitment to the conservatives. He saw peace as an opportunity to achieve national 
goals in a more cooperative way.
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The Syrian-Israeli case took a different turn. Assad wanted to secure his place in 
the “New World Order”, therefore peace wordd both cut political and economic costs 
and at the same instant it would provide him suf&cient time to design a strategy of 
getting the Golan back through peaceful means. Assad was a facilitator towards 
negotiations. Rabin with his proposals of land for peace was a definite facilitator 
towards negotiations. The change of government was a sign that the public supported 
him and peace. His leadership style was unique in the sense that he was ready to take 
initiatives.
The two cases fit well with Proposition Vlll. In the states that was discussed the 
leader towers over any theoretical institution that is present but its powers are limited. 
Begin’s intransigence hmited his space for maneuver. Even at Camp David his 
refusal to accept the last item on the agreement almost destroyed the peace initiative. 
COSTS OUTWEIGHING BENEFITS
It is usualy assumed that once costs, whether political (pressme from the 
international arena,govemment losing support), economic (embargo, inflation rate 
increasing) or social( domestic instabilities, riots) start to outweigh the benefits 
(getting a territory back, responding to a threat), leaders revise their policies and 
decide to put coercive measures aside. Costs outweighing benefits variable is usually 
a facilitator towards negotiations.
SYRIA& ISRAEL
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In the Egyptian-Israeli case, Sadat viewed the costs as being great, a conflict with 
Israel would continue to be a burden on the Egyptian economy. Over investment in 
arms resulted in decrease in social welfare reforms which created an ungratified 
public that threatened his legitamacy. Costs was a facilitator towards negotiations. 
Begin saw the costs as losing his population in wars, a small population could become 
extinct if precautions were not taken. If “Eretz Israel”(Greater Israel) was desired, 
then in order to have a state, the population was vital plus investments could be 
channeled into social reforms. Costs was a definite facilitator towards negotiations 
even if Begin was not too happy with cooperating with Sadat.
SYRIA& ISRAEL
In the Syrian-Israeli case, Assad identified the costs as being high and decided to 
pursue a different policy without giving up the idea of getting the Golan. Costs, 
mostly being political and economic, forced him into revising his strategies. It was a 
facilitator towards negotiations. Rabin identified the costs as the occupied lands 
backdrafting Israel’s growth and striking a deal with one of the Arab leaders (Sadat 
had taken the initiaitve but Camp David had not been absorbed by any of the 
neighboring states and Egypt had been pushed towards isolation) would open the way 
to others. The costs variable was a facilitator towards negotiations.
The results of the analysis for the costs outweighing benefits was in 
accordance with Proposition IX. In states where the leader is more dominant then 
the set institutions, once the leader decides to cooperate it is usually an uninterrupted 
process.
EGYPT«& ISRAEL
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CHANGE IN PRIORITY
It is usually assiuned that change in priority, the decision to quit coercion and take 
cooperation as a policy is a facilitator towards negotiations.
EGYPT& ISRAEL
In the Egyptian-Israeli case, Sadat had to change his priority(ffom attacking Israel 
to cooperating). It was more beneficial to Egypt just as in the previous variable, what 
had been lost in military build up could be gained back by negotiating. To Sadat his 
decision to change policies was a facilitator towards negotiations. Begin also wanted 
to benefit from his mild policies toward Egypt. His benefits would be assisted by the 
US. It was also a facilitator towards negotiations.
SYRIA& ISRAEL
In the Syrian-Israeli case, Assad changed his priority of coercion but not the 
desire to get Golan Heights back. Since peace appeared to be more beneficial, some 
modifications had to be made. Change in priority was a facilitator towards 
negotiations. Rabin also changed the priority that was set by the previous Likud 
government. Since peace was at hand coercive methods could not be relied upon. 
Therefore change in priority variable was a facilitator. The findings were in 
accordance with Proposition X. The decision to quit coercion and take cooperation 
as a policy was a move that both Assad and Rabin had made and this facilitated the 
pre-negotiation process towards conflict termination.
The first major conclusion of the study is that most of the initial propositions 
were supported. It shows that due to structural differences (i.e change from bi­
polarity to multi-polarity) and constraints in the domestic political system some 
variables were not applicable.
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The comparison of the two cases put forward the finding that the variable which 
appeared most frequently was under the leader category. Out of the four variables 
three (leader change/ leadership style, costs outweighing benefits, change in priority) 
were facilitators and one (threat of looming disaster) was not applicable. As a grand 
total 12 out of 16 was a facilitator when the two cases were combmed.
The second most frequently mentioned category was the international context. 
There were eight facilitators (different variables for different states) out of 12, one 
hinderance (allies for Egypt), one neutral and two not applicables.
Finally, the category which was a hinderance toward negotiations was the 
domestic circumstance. There was only one facilitator (pubhc opinion for Israel in the 
Syrian-Israeli conflict) out of 12, four hinderances, one neutral (public opinion for 
Israel in the Egyptian-Israeli conflict) and four not applicables.
A bold comparison of the facilitating factors between the two cases shows that, the 
second case “The Syrian-Israeli” case contains a greater amount of facilitating 
factors.
As a total the Syrian-Israeli case has 12 facilitating, four hindering variables. 
There are also six not applicable and one neutral variable. Compared to nine 
facilitators, four hinderance, six not applicables and one neutral variables of the 
Egyptian-Israeli conflict, the former case towers over the latter. The not applicable 
and neutral variables are same in number. Facilitating and hindering variables differ. 
According to these results the Syrian-Israeli conflict contains more facilitating 
variables than the Egyptian-Israeli conflict. However, it is worthwhile to note that 
the most significant difference between the two cases is that, the Egyptian-Israeli 
conflict ended, resulting in an agreement, whereas the Syrian-Israeli conflict lingers
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on. Although this may sovind contradictory with the above results, three major 
inferences can be made based upon the findings.
First of all the fact that the second case has more facilitating factors can be a sign 
for a possible agreement in the future for Syria and Israel.
Second, the fact that the first case terminated with an agreement despite its low 
frequency in facilitating variables, may denote that the simple frequency count of the 
variables does not determine the outcome of the pre-negotiation phase. The 
“quality” of the variables is as important as their number of appearance in each case. 
In other words, the impact of the variables may differ. For example the role of the 
intermediary in the Egyptian- Israeli case is more of a “Big Brother” where Egypt is 
supported like a state that is a member of the capitalist block. Whereas in the Syrian- 
Israeli case, the US takes on the role of a mediator, where Syria is not protected as 
intensely as Egypt. The effect of the variable may be the same, being a facihtator ia 
both cases, but its impact is distinct to each particular conflict.
Finally it can be inferred that pre-negotiation phase can not be determinate all by 
itself Pre-negotiation phase of conflict termination is an important first step towards 
an agreement but what is decisive is the total process of negotiation.
The findings and the inferences of this study could prepare a fertile groimd for 
researchers. Elaboration and further analysis of the research can contribute to the 
field of conflict resolution and hopefully open new frontiers towards attaining peace.
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TABLE 5 : COMBINED RESULTS FOR THE EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI
A N D  SYRIAN-ISRAELI CONFLICTS
1 o M. , L E A D.
,RA L ;SC>" ^IPD RPO RNGO TL D CL/LS COB CP
Facilit
ating
Effect
3 4 1 0 1 4 0 4 4 4
Hinder
ing
Effect
1 0 0 3 1 0 0 0 0 0
Neutra
1
0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
N ot
Applic
able
0 0 2 1 1 0 4 0 0 0
INT. International Context 
DOM. D om estic Circumstance 
LEAD. Leader
RA; R ole o f  A llies
RL : R ole o f  Intermediary
S C : System ic Change
IPD; Intra-Party Dispute
RPO: R ole o f  Public Opinion
RNGOiRole o f  N G O ’s
TLD; Threat o f  Loom ing Disaster
CL/LS: Change in Leader/ Leadership Style
COB: Costs Outweighing Benefits
CP : Change In Priority.
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